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ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to formulate a model for conceptualizing the real-
estate development process based on an understanding of entrepreneurship.
The tasks confronted by a real estate developer benefit little from the
rationalized, orderly production techniques that have been introduced
into other industries of similar magnitude. Development projects are
typically carried out in a highly fluid and uncertain environment charac-
terized by fragmentation and conflict. Each project requires a unique,
and often momentary convergence of talent, resources, and an array of
public boards and special interest groups.
The technique and skills necessary to organize and orchestrate the
development process in such an environment are only partially elucidated
in the real estate literature. In this thesis, six case study sketches
are drawn from the actions and attitudes of individuals who assumed
primary responsibility for initiation and seeing their projects through
to completion. The cases represent development experiences in private
companies as well as in non-profit organizations and a public authority.
The information from these case studies serves to identify a general
pattern of action necessary to successfully implement a development
project.
The conclusion drawn from the cases is that the development "process"
is, in practice, the incremental aggregation and deployment of resources.
The specific character of the process for an individual project only
gains its form through successive strategic actions to expand a project's
base of support and control the level of risk. The entrepreneurial role
of the developer is to identify opportunities for constructive action,
catalyze a supportive environment for the project, and provide consistent
leadership throughout the process to overcome doubt and conflict.
Thesis Supervisor: Gary Hack
Title: Assistant Professor of Urban Studies & Planning
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PREFACE
Since my days in the Peace Corps I have been fascinated by the
complexity of implementing development projects. The project I was
assigned to had been the brain child of a Peace Corps Director and a
regional Commandant both of whom were reassigned by the time I arrived.
Ostensibly, my task was to supervise the reconstruction of a 50 mile
access road that serviced a natural orange production area deep in the
heart of the Guinea Mountains. However, I soon discovered that the
project had almost no money, the local villagers snoke a dialect that
the Peace Corps did not teach, and the new commandant was only
interested in the assistance of this young American if it came with a
major capital contribution to his public works department.
Contrary to the original plan, my task in fact became one of
reversing the institutional momentum behind this absurd project and
redirecting my energies and limited finances toward a more feasible
and desired local project. Following eight months of documenting the
actual financial requirements of the road project, identifying the
need for other types of projects, and a running dispute over who
would control the money, I finally harangued the powers that be to
assign me to a school construction project.
This experience left a lasting impression, and my subsequent
professional activities in development and planning have reinforced
my feelings about the development process. No matter how precise
the plan or how generally accepted the technical formulas, the
iv
fundamental task in development is one of strategic initiative in a
chaotic and unpredictable environment.
In my studies of real estate development I have always been
struck by the difference between what is written on the subject and
how it is experienced in the field. There seems to be scant informa-
tion on the techniques and skills actually required to effectively
implement a project. The development process is either segmented
into an orderly progression of production stages for pedagogic
illustration of specific technical skills, or it is described in case
studies as the convergence of social and economic forces that appear
to combine more as a random occurence than by skill and strategy.
This thesis represents the culmination of an effort to formulate
a general set of guidelines for understanding the means of the
development process. I turn to the concept of entrepreneurship because
it focuses specifically on the skills necessary to create new patterns
in the existing order. Implementing a development project is much
like starting a new enterprise. One begins with a general idea of the
final outcome, often limited resources, and a sustaining will to bring
the idea to fruition. The path from idea to reality, whether in real
estate development or in industry, has no dependable roadmap and is
lined with doubters and detractors. Entrepreneurship suggests a
process of creative discovery and strategic intervention as the
realities of the task are revealed. It is this quality that appears
particularly appropriate for gaining and understanding of one's role
as a development entrepreneur.
v
INTRODUCTION
Scan the skyline of any city and one will discover the physical
legacy of thousands of individuals who, at one point in time, had
only a partial knowledge of the overall impact of their work. This
skyline, whether it be dominated by jutting skyscrapers or a modest
collection of row houses and small scale commercial structures, can
be appreciated and evaluated in a variety of ways. For the architect
the collection of buildings that form the physical character of the
city is appreciated in aesthetic terms. For the economist and
geographer it is density gradients and the relationship between land
values and highest and best use. For the historian it is the
interplay of social and political forces that have manifested them-
selves physically over time. And for the business analyst the city
and its structures is viewed in terms of comparative advantage and
return on investment.
Each of these points of view provide valuable insight into the
fabric of the city and the parameters that establish the context
within which incremental additions are made. But they provide little
insight into how something is built on a particular site at a specific
point in time. Yet it is the dynamic set of interactions and indi-
vidual choices in the particular instance that over time yield the
evidence for more aggregate analysis. Just as a painting may be
objectively placed in a progression of artistic conventions one may
not fully appreciate a piece of art without understanding the subjec-
tive qualities of the individual who labored to leave his/her
I
2personal mark in the piece.
It is with this appreciation for the individual and his or her
incremental impact on the flow of events that this thesis will
evaluate urban development through the lens of entrepreneurship.
Admittedly, entrepreneurship is a somewhat ill-defined subject. It
is frequently associated with the actions of those great individuals
who emerge at key moments in history to dramatically alter the course
of economic affairs. Or the character of entrepreneurship can be
described from the actions of many small businessmen who, by vision,
guts, and tenacity, build a company from little more than an idea.
This thesis will attempt to identify key attributes of entrepreneur-
ship drawn from the range of entrepreneurial experiences that are
relevant to real estate development. This is neither a study of
great moments in history, nor is it a glorification of personal
initiative and risk-taking.
Real estate development is, in many respects, unique among
industries of similar magnitude. The development organization, to
deliver its product, must function in an environment of dispersed
and disorganized resources, political negotiation, and often
sporadic consensus on the desired outcome. As such, the character
of development is more that of an interactive, fragmented process
than that of an integrated industry organized around the delivery
of a physical product. Each project requires the selective tailor-
ing of the "production process" to accommodate a new set of partici-
pants and resources. Previous experience or knowledge of the
3process from another project provides few standards with which to guide
action in a new setting.
It is the developer (whether in a private company, a neighbor-
hood non-profit group, or in the project division of a large organi-
zation) who primarily assumes the responsibility for hand crafting
the process, and assembling and directing the resources toward the
completion of a project. But what are the guidelines for undertaking
this function in a fluid, uncertain environment where little formal
authority exists over many of the key forces that can determine
success or failure.
The literature on real estate, as a source of instruction,
presents a kaleidoscope image on this question. Like the blind men
describing the elephant, each investigation of the development process
takes its form from the perspective of viewer. For some development
is a construction process and the key ingredients consist of site
selection, design, and project management. For others it is a poli-
tical process and the key elements become constituency building,
gamesmanship, and negotiation. For still others it is an economic
process and identifying sources of capital, determining project
feasibility, creative financing, and marketing determine the fate of
a project. In practice development must call on each, but the key to
success is the ability to draw all of these ingredients together to
fit the requirements of a specific project.
This thesis will explore a model of action based on the
experiences of those who were left to find the glue to piece together
'4
the fragments into the patchwork known as the development process.
As such, this is not a story about real estate. It is an investiga-
tion of entrepreneurship, and the entrepreneurs who begin with an
idea and proceed to make it reality. In the process of the explora-
tion, this thesis will attempt to address three basic questions:
1. What are the essential skills of entrepreneurship as it
applies to real estate development?
2. What are the personal attitudes and characteristics of
those who play an entrepreneurial role in development?
3. Do these differ between organizations which are explicitly
profit oriented and those with broader social objectives?
The core of the discussion consists of six case studies. They
were selected to represent a range of contexts (private, public, and
quasi-public) in which development entrepreneurs are found. Each
case is based on the key individual who provided the initial impetus
for a development project and assumed primary responsibility for its
implementation. I
Edward is president of a small, private development firm. The
example he chose to describe his entrepreneurial role is
a three-year process to secure a rezoning for a ninety acre
industrial and office park.
1At several points in their discussions, the participants indi
cated a hesitance to be frank about their role in manipulating cir-
cumstances to fit their needs. Yet this was exactly the information
needed for this study. So, to avoid any breech of implied confidence,
the names have been changed and to the extent possible locational
characteristics have been deleted.
5Jesse is executive director of a non-profit community develop-
ment corporation. His example is the implementation of
a 32-unit residential rehabilitation project.
Stan is a senior partner in a large, private development firm
specialized in shopping centers. His example of entre-
preneurship consists of a five year.implementation process
for a regional shopping center.
Edward is a project manager in a public development authority.
Edward was responsible for the implementation of the
redevelopment of the fish pier on the Boston waterfront.
Adam is president of a small development and construction firm
with a diversified experience in office parks, housing,
and industrial facilities. Adam chose to discuss two
examples of his entrepreneurial style: the financing of
a small office facility, and the implementation of a
three-phase industrial park.
Peter is executive director of a small non-profit housing
development corporation. Peter's example illustrates his
role in changing local tax policy to make possible the
implementation of the rehabilitation of a six unit
abandoned rental property.
The case studies do not present a random sample of all develop-
ment experiences, but rather provide suggestive material to under-
stand development from the entrepreneurial perspective. Thus, the
case studies represent highly subjective personal stories. No
6independent verification of the events or actions described in the
cases has been made.
The contents of the case studies reflect the dual purpose of
this analysis. To understand the development entrepreneur as a
person, each participant was asked to describe his personal
experiences and motivations that led him to enter the real estate
field. They were further requested to reflect on their attitudes
toward the long-term contribution of their work, and their attitude
toward personal risk.
The actual nature of the participants' entrepreneurial actions
is reflected in their description of specific development projects.
Each participant was asked to describe an experience that captured
the general complexity of the development process and best highlighted
his entrepreneurial role in stimulating and guiding events to maximize
the success of the project. During the presentation the interviewer
only asked sufficient questions to insure adequate coverage of each
of the main topics. The cases are reported, as much as possible, in
the terms and sequence as described by the participants.
To understand development as an entrepreneurial process, it is
first necessary to formulate a model that encompasses all of the
variables that the development entrepreneur must manipulate in the
implementation of a project. In Section 1I, the literature on real
estate will be briefly reviewed to identify two models for action.
These models are formulated to reflect alternative conceptualizations
of the development process provided by the variety of research on the
7subject. The section will conclude with a synthesis model that
appears appropriate to conceptualize development as described by the
development entrepreneurs in the cases.
Section III will present the case studies. In Section IV and
Section V the material from the case studies will be summarized to
present the essential aspects of entrepreneurship and the characteris-
tics of the development entrepreneur. The thesis will conclude with
a discussion of how the attitudes toward and methods of entrepreneur-
ship appears to differ between individuals affiliated with profit
motivated organizations and those in organizations established to
achieve broader social objectives.
MODELS OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
The real estate development field has been the subject of
intensive investigation and analysis over the past three decades.
The persistent fragmentation in the industry, the desire to incor-
porate development into the framework of public policy, and the
highly political nature of the development process set real estate
apart from other forms of industry of similar scale and economic
impact.
Real estate, as an industry, appears to be formed by a pattern
of sub-industries: each with its own characteristics and each one
contributing its specialized expertise to the development process.
Law, marketing, finance, construction, architecture, engineering,
public land-use controls all form tributaries into the stream of the
development process,and each may be investigated for its key contri-
bution to the realization of the final product. As a result, analysis
of real estate as a production process often takes a highly variegated
form. Yet when summarized into conceptual categories distinct pat-
terms emerge.
In this section, the literature on real estate development will
be briefly reviewed to identify alternative models for conceptual-
izing the relationship among the range of activities and subunits that
must be assembled into the production process. With a literature as
rich and varied as that on real estate, the boundaries of these
categories are somewhat indefinite, and they do not pretend to
capture all of the subtle variations on the theme of development.
8
9Rather, these models will provide the means for describing alternative
patterns of activity that characterize the central function of the
developer and his or her relationship to the development process.
The Technical Model
The predominant means for conceptualizing the development process,
suggested by the literature, is to view it in the technical terms of
the various professions that must be drawn upon for a project to pro-
gress from inception through implementation. Most of the educational
and many of the case study works take this form. For instructive
purposes the development process is neatly divided into phases begin-
ning with market analysis, progressing through site selection and
design, and ending with construction management and marketing of the
final product. 2 Each phase is discussed as a discrete unit as if the
development process were tied together by a unifying logic that may be
found in any situation. The supporting case study research takes each
generally described phase and subjects it to the light of actual
experience. 3
The most precise conceptualization of the development process
within the broad category of what is here termed the technical model
grows out of Wallace Smith's work on housing development. In Figure 1
2See John McMahon, Property Development (N.J.: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1976) and Arthur Weimer, et al., Real Estate (N.J.:
John Wiley and Sons, 1978).
3An example of case study illustration of the phases of the
development process can be found in Philip David, Urban Land Develop-
ment (Homewood, Ill.: Richard B. Irwin, Inc.).
FIGURE 1. DEVELOPER DECISION SEQUENCE: TECHNICAL MODEL
Source: Wallace Smith, Housing: The Social and Economic Elements,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 270.
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Smith's model describes the development process in an ordered sequence
of decisions and actions that progress as information is gathered and
assimilated. Although Smith is one of the few to render his ideas
in such a comprehensive graphic form, the basic thrust of the
model typifies the technical approach to real estate development.5
The technical model describes a production process that is highly
predictable in its pattern and rational in its execution. Although
actual practice may require modifications in the process, the model
suggests the correct way of organizing the development activity for
maximum efficiency and expediency.
Thus, the model describes the development process as a sequence
of incremental tasks, decisions, and actions that can be ordered into
a smooth progression. Each phase provides a decision point at which
a determination may be made to terminate or proceed with the process.
External factors such as lack of bank interest, local development or
land-use policy, or recalcitrant neighborhood groups or contiguous
land owners are absorbed into the process as feedback information.
These facts exist beyond the sphere of the development process and
influence its pattern only to the extent that accommodation is
possible or termination is necessary as the process unfolds.
Models that describe the development process in such rationalized
Wallace Smith, Housing: The Social and Economic Elements
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 270.
5Addition illustrations of the development process as a sequen-
tial progressional are in President's Committee on Urban Housing, A
Decent Home (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969),
p. 115 and Weimer, et al., Real Estate, p. 301.
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terms grow out of a desire to introduce order into an otherwise frag-
mented industry. As such, they provide a normative standard to
suggest how a process -ought to be conducted. Caveats are usually
included to stress that actual experience may significantly diverge
from the norm. However, like many formulas, the prevalent use of this
type of model to describe the development process create the impression
that it can, in fact, be used to structure one's thinking about appro-
priate behavior in practice. This impression is reinforced when
examples of the developer's role in the process are offered.
Development, as conceived by the technical model, is a highly
rational, analytical activity. Decisions are dispassionately made
based on a thorough understanding of the general objectives for each
project. And professional and financial resources are deployed in an
efficient and programmed manner.
As a dispassioned decision-maker the developer's function is to
identify project opportunities and establish strategies to maximize
their potential. "They buy land and hold it until it is ripe for
development, promote projects of various types, buy and sell property,
change property from a lower to a higher use and engage in other
(profitable) activities." 6  If a project does not meet these objec-
tives another is sought out that will. Alternatively, it is suggested
that the developer assists in the production process by nature of his
specialized knowledge and ability to orchestrate and monitor the
6Wallace Smith, Housing, p. 268.
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FIGURE 11. RELATIONSHIP OF DEVELOPER TO DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: TECHNICAL MODEL
activities under his or her direction. "He formulates a plan,
assembles resources, manages the transformation of these resources
into a product . . . and sells that output. His own input is his
knowledge of the "market," skill in business and legal matters . . .
knowledge of technology and design in a broad sense, and a willing-
ness to hear the risk that his efforts may yield less than was
expected."7
Figure I illustrates an interpretation of the basic framework
of the development process suggested by the technical model. The
programmed activities of the process, as described by Smith, are con-
tained in a project sphere which represents all of the potential
variables directly related to implementation. The project sphere,
thus, serves as the lens by which resources and energies are focused
on the desired project outcome. The scope and content of the project
sphere may vary from project to project but this is determined only
by the project's specific requirements.
Conceptually, this model suggests that each project will
internally prescribe the scope of resources and actions necessary
for its implementation. For instance a new shopping center in an
untested market area may require substantially more planning and
market analysis than the addition of one building in an existing
office park. Or, the need for permits and zoning variances may be
greater for a new facility than for the rehabilitation of an older one,
7 Arthur Weimer, Real Estate, p. 10
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The thrust of the model, however, is that the relationship and
relative significance among the tasks in the project sphere is a
function of the flexible application of a general procedural framework
to the individual project specifications. It is the requirements of
predetermined project outcome that are looked to for guidance for
structuring the development process.
The external environment surrounding the project sphere does not
appear as a differentiated entity. External factors such as zoning
requirements, community attitudes toward development, or variations in
bank lending policies do impact on the implementation process; however,
operationally these variables only serve as a source of information to
determine ongoing feasibility and to identify potential opportunities
for accommodation within the preeminent constraints of the project.
For example the initial development plan may encounter local resistance
over the proposed traffic access point. If possible, the plan is then
redesigned to accommodate the requested change and the feasibility of
the project is reassessed. If the assessment continues to be consis-
tent with the established standards of feasibility, the changes will be
accepted. If it is not, the change will either be rejected or if
necessary an alternative will be proposed. Should resistance prove
insurmountable the project is abandoned.
As mentioned, the technical model has been formulated to present
normative standards by which to measure the divergence of actual
experience against what might occur under ideal conditions. However,
the model articulates a general method for considering the appropriate
16
structuring of the development process.
1. Prior to the commencement of the development process,
establish a clear quantified objective to be achieved by the
project.
2. Gather all available information that may serve to guide the
formulation of a project plan and to determine the relative
significance of tasks in the project sphere.
3. Within the above two constraints formulate the most complete
and detailed plan possible.
4. Modify the plan only as additional information becomes
available or resistance must be overcome.
5. Terminate the project if it does not continue to meet the
initial objectives.
As suggested in Figure 11, the developer in this case is seen
as the captain of the ship. He or she is the central authority in
establishing project objectives and deploying resources to achieve
the desired project outcome. Decisions are made rationally based on
a clear understanding of the standards set for the project. And the
developer provides the necessary technical skill to both make basic
judgements on project feasibility and to monitor the contracted
services under his or her direction in the project sphere.
The determination of risk in this model appears to be a deductive
calculation. Since the developer will only begin the development
process when sufficient information is available to reduce the level
of uncertainty to minimum levels, a general measure of the overall
17
risk associated with a project can be defined at the beginning.
Willingness to bear the risk of a project failing to achieve the
desired objectives can, thereby, be determined based on a general,
acceptable standard.
The Contextual Model
In sharp contrast to the technical model, a large segment of
the real estate literature applies the concepts of group dynamics,
sociology and political science to gain an understanding of the
development process. Composed primarily of case studies, these works
focus on the characteristics of the context that surround a particular
project. The development process understood from this perspective is
a historical and political event. The directed sequence of production
phases suggested in the technical model became overshadowed by the
intense interplay of such variables as planning boards, special interest
groups, public agencies, investment policies, etc. Each of these
powerful and autonomous influences have the potential to obstruct or
facilitate the flow of events within the development process beyond the
will or desires of those who assume responsibility for a particular
project. If the technical model is formulated to show how the develop-
ment process ought to be conducted, the contextual case study attempts
to investigate how it is conducted.
Contextual case studies abound in the literature. A representa-
tive example of how such works conceptualize the role of the developer
and the development process is illustrated by Phil David's study of
a 1,750 unit residential project in Washington D.C,8 The study begins
with a detailed investigation of the various influences that set the
stage for the project. Federal housing policy, life insurance lending
policies, the programs of the Federal Housing Administration, and the
set of prominent local individuals who exercised control over the
development plan for the area are all identified.
Thus, the developer (Mr. Scheuer) enters an environment structured
by a history of previous interaction and independent expectation on the
desired outcome of the project. From the beginning, Mr. Scheuer was
faced with a situation of negotiation and compromise over what actually
would be developed. His experience with development was limited, and
he began the process with only a general sense of what actually would
be developed on the site. "Before submitting this plan to the FHA,
Mr. Scheuer first had to run the gauntlet of plan approval from four
other government agencies--the district government, the Redevelopment
Land Agency, the National Capitol Planning Commission, and the dis-
trict's Fine Arts Commission--plus six district departments that each
had to approve a particular facet of the development" 9
After seven months of creative accommodation and negotiation a
physical plan was finally produced that gained local approval.
However, the financing and rent structure were subject to further
UPhil David, Urban Land Development, pp. 383-398.
9lbid., p. 390.
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FIGURE IlII. CONTEXTUAL MODEL OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
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influence by the FHA. The compromises necessary to gain local ap-
proval had produced a plan with several aspects the FHA considered
either too risky or that would require a superfluous increase in
project costs. As a result, FHA officials intervened to force Mr.
Stearns to redesign the project to include more income producing uses
which would allow lower rents.
Contextual case studies such as this one suggest a very different
attitude toward the development process from that illustrated by the
technical model. The model in Figure III is a means of conceptual-
izing the development process based on contextual case studies. Sur-
rounding the project sphere is a wider sphere of environmental
influences that play a direct role in defining the project outcome.
Conceptually, this arrangement adds a new dimension to the development
process.
The technical model suggests that a clearly defined project
objective be established prior to initiating the development process.
This objective serves both to prescribe the activities in the project
sphere and to identify the overall risks associated with a particular
project. The environmental influences, which are here contained in
a sphere defined as the development field, only serve to inform judge-
ment of the project's feasibility and force accommodation within a
predetermined project plan.
In the contextual model, the factors in the development field
take on a much more differentiated and instrumental role in determining
the character of the completed project. Thus, the development process
21
is composed of a sequence of dynamic interactions between the tasks of
the project sphere and the factors of the development field. As the
example above suggests, the process begins with only a general sense
of the final outcome and the activities in the project sphere must be
arranged to retain maximum responsiveness to the external environment.
"The study of implementation requires understanding that apparently
simple sequences of events depend on complex chains of reciprocal
interactions. 10
Although contextual case studies are not offered as explicit guides
for a general understanding of the development process in the same
manner as texts that follow the technical model, they do from a sug-
gestive source of information on the practice of development. General-
izing from these studies an operational method emerges:
1. Investigate, to the extent possible, the personalities and
policies that may influence the project outcome.
2. Identify general project criteria, and formulate a conceptual
plan that would appear to have the highest potential for
consensus within the development field.
3. Incrementally expand activities in the project sphere as
negotiations reach key points of compromise on specific
aspects of a project's content.
4. The responsibility for bringing a project to realization is
spread among an array of autonomous actors and therefore risk
10Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Implementation
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. xviii.
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is determined as a function of emerging patterns of consensus.
5. The decision to terminate a project does not rest with any one
individual or group.
The role of the developer does not appear well differentiated in
the case study literature that follows the contextual model. He or she
is a single source of initiative integrated into a larger context of
equally independent sources of power. Thus, the developer lacks the
self determination suggested in the technical model. The nature of
development process, from the developer's point of view, is predeter-
mined prior to his or her entry. Many of the characteristics imposed
on a project from the various influences and coalitions within the
development field are accepted as givens beyond the influence of the
developer.
Decision-making under these circumstances is primarily reactive
due to the lack of autonomous authority. As the development process
proceeds from one point of negotiation to the next, new actors and
expectations emerge which must be contended with. The principal skill
of the developer is, therefore, the ability to negotiate compromise in
the extreme.. It is not really necessary that he or she have any par-
ticular expertise in development other than the skill to bring about
mutual agreement among disparate parties.
The notion of risk in the contextual model appears twofold. On
the one hand, the lack of a clear definition of a project outcome and
the uncertainty surrounding the dynamics of negotiation and compromise
would suggest that the risk of failure would be high and unpredictable.
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The rational, analytical developer in the technical model would have few
guides with which to measure risk against an acceptable standard.
However, the distribution of responsibility for the implementation of
a project among a variety of autonomous participants also spreads the
consequences of failure. Development is, in effect, a group effort.
the developer minimizes his exposure to risk both by controlling invest-
ment in the project sphere and by the fact that the operative source of
a project's initiation is diffused among a broad range of actors.
An Entrepreneurial Model
Entrepreneurship in development, as expressed in the case studies
that follow, is a highly subjective, dynamic form of activity, sus-
tained over time to achieve a specific end. The technical model appears
to overly restrict the scope of entrepreneurial initiative. It suggests
that the principal entrepreneurial act is identifying project oppor-
tunities and bearing the risk of deciding to proceed. Once the process
begins, implementation becomes a technical and managerial task. The
contextual model, on the other hand, obscures the role of independent
entrepreneurial action.
Based on the information in the case studies, the model in
Figure IV is offered as a means of conceptualizing the development
process as seen through the eyes of the development entrepreneur. The
model attempts to introduce two concepts that appear important for
understanding the development process as expressed in the case studies:
relative autonomy and spheres of influence.
DEVELOPMENT ENTREPRENEL3
Organization Builder
Strategic Decision-Maker
Public Relations Skills
Incremental Risk-Taker
PROJECT SPHERE
Market Analysis
Site-Use DAtesnination
Development Team
Finance Packaging
Permits & Approvals
Construction Management
Marketing
DEVELOPMENT FIELD
Public Boards
Informal Constituencies
Politicians
Neighborhood Groups
Land Owners
/ Finance Sources
Competitors
Non-Project Objectives
COMPLETED PROJECT
FIGURE IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL MODEL OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
25
For entrepreneurship to occur, an individual or group must have
sufficient autonomy to take initiative and deploy resources to stimu-
late events that are beneficial to the realization of the desired
outcome whether that be a new company or a real estate project.
However, an entrepreneur usually begins with little more than an idea
of what may be possible and rarely has direct control over all the
factors and resources necessary for the implementation of his or her
idea.
The entrepreneurial advantage is derived from a position of rela-
tive autonomy with respect to other actors who must participate in the
realization of a new venture. In most instances of entrepreneurship,
it is the entrepreneur who is primarily concerned with the ultimate
success of the venture. Although the entrepreneur must rely on others
for financing, permits, and specialized technical skill, he or she
does not become submerged into the set of constraints imposed by the
expectations and requirements of third parties. The entrepreneur must
retain a position of relative autonomy to identify new opportunities
for initiative throughout the stages of the development process and
formulate creative strategies with which to motivate those less
committed to the final success of the project.
A second notion suggested by Figure IV that provides an insight
into the material in the case studies is spheres of influence. Unlike
the absolute authority expressed in the technical model or the random
reactive nature of the contextual model, this model attempts to illus-
trate the range of interactive variables over which the development
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entrepreneur must exercise personal influence and persuasion. The
fragmentation of the development process offers the development entre-
preneur little formal authority. However, the case studies suggest
that the development entrepreneur plays an instrumental role in
initiating and orchestrating activities at the three basic levels
expressed in the model: his or her own internal organization, the
development field, and the activities in the project sphere. The
aspects of this function will be discussed in detail in Section IV.
The developer in this model is primarily an organization builder.
He or she uses the position of relative autonomy to organize resources
and coalitions to aid in the implementation of a project. Thus, the
development entrepreneur makes strategic decisions to prompt an anti-
cipated pattern of response. The case studies will illustrate that
these decisions are neither highly analytical nor are they purely
reactive. Strategic decisions are based on a somewhat intuitive under-
standing of the potential consequences of choosing one action over
another.
Risk-taking under these conditions is highly incremental in nature.
As the development process unfolds in each of the case studies, the
development entrepreneur incrementally discovers the extent of uncer-
tainty that surrounds his project. However, unlike the contextual
model each sees himself as bearing the primary responsibility of con-
trolling events to increase the changes for success.
Although the case studies suggest a range of skills on the part of
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the development entrepreneur (some of which will be discussed in Section
IV and V) public relations skills are usd in Figure IV to distinguish
this model from the previous two. The development entrepreneur must
possess sufficient technical and negotiation skills to deal with these
aspects of the development process, but the ability to positively
motivate people appears as the key determinate of success.
SIX CASE STUDIES
As suggested by the model in Figure IV, real estate development
is a highly subjective and interactive process. The development
entrepreneur is placed at the center of a highly fluid environment of
personal relationships, competition, and reciprocal accommodation.
The process of molding these variables to the need of a particular
project benefits from few rules and even fewer predictable cause-effect
relationships.
In this section, six personal experiences with the real estate
development process are presented. In each, the person interviewed
served the central function of initiating a project and orchestrating
events to insure its completion. As stated earlier, there has been
no attempt to objectively verify their version of the flow of events
that surround their projects. For the purposes of this thesis, it
is sufficient to understand how each development entrepreneur per-
ceived the context of his activities and based on these perceptions
formulated strategies to guide the development process.
The cases are divided into two basic parts. The first describes
the life experiences and values that led each individual into the
real estate field. This section will provide an insight into the
character and skills that form the basis for their subsequent develop-
ment activities. The material from these background sections will be
drawn upon for a general discussion of the personal attributes of a
development entrepreneur in Section V.
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The second half of each case study is devoted to a detailed
description of a specific development experience that best illustrates
the entrepreneurial style of the participant. Each description is
presented, as much as possible, in the terms and sequence as remembered
by the person interviewed. In Section IV, the examples from these
sections of the case studies will be used to illustrate the basic tasks
of entrepreneurship in real estate development.
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Howard
Background. Howard grew up in Vienna, Austria and came to the
U.S. as a teenager with his parents who were fleeing the social and
religious turmoil of Europe in the late 1930s. He gained an early
exposure to both construction and entrepreneurial spirit through his
family. His grandfather and uncle were both blacksmiths and his
father became an architect. His father was instrumental in bringing
Bauhaus design concepts to Vienna and became a leader in architectural
circles of the time. Upon arriving in the U.S. his father established
an architectural firm in New York City and his mother started a
company that produced women's clothing accessories which grew quickly
to over sixty employees.
The traditions of self-employment were strong in Howard's family,
but when it came time to consider a career in this new country he
chose the more technical field of engineering and enrolled in City
University of New York. Following a tour in the Navy during the war,
he finished his engineering degree, but the interest in architecture
and building derived from his family remained with him. During his
four year apprenticeship as a structural design engineer with a large,
international construction firm, Howard pursued a degree in architec-
ture at night school. Although he never finished the architectural
degree these two experiences provided the blend of interests and
expertise that would guide him throughout his career.
Howard's first opportunity to gain significant authority and
organizational skill came when he joined an emerging construction
31
company at the age of twenty-six. Beginning as a construction super-
intendent, he advanced quickly to become vice president of the
company in charge of engineering and construction. Running as many
as fourteen jobs at one time, he developed a capacity to organize and
orchestrate large numbers of people and realized his ability to
handle the often chaotic and unpredictable nature of construction.
"What I loved about this job was that it blended my two interests
(construction and engineering) and that I was breaking problems all
the time."
When his company merged with a larger national construction firm,
Howard was placed in charge of the New England regional office and
moved to Boston. The real estate boom at the mid 1970s provided the
impetus for the company to explore a development role as well as
general construction: a move very consistent with Howard's growing
interest in real estate development. To take on this new responsi-
bility, Howard co-founded two additional companies: a full-service
management company and a syndication and financial services company.
The recession of 1980 brought the rapid growth and diversifica-
tion of the company to an end, and it was decided to close out the
New England office. Howard was well established in Boston and had
come to enjoy running his own relatively autonomous operation. When
he was offered a similar position in Texas with what now had become
a rather large, bureaucratic organization, he declined and began to
build his own development company but "with a different accent."
"I no longer have an interest in directly controlling every aspect
of construction through a large internal organization. I now want to
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control the process by writing the prescription in contracts or super-
imposing a generally knowledgeable staff member at key points."
This desire for flexible "ad hoc solutions" and a smaller, more
tightly held team guided Howard in setting up his new company. He
chose as a partner a real estate lawyer who had been actively involved
in democratic party politics at the state level for many years. To
complement his skills, and the legal and political skills of his part-
ner, Howard recruited two project managers: one with a background in
real estate analysis and business administration and the other in
land-use planning and historic preservation. These four individuals,
along with a secretary, would form the entire internal staff of the
organization.
Risks and Rewards. Howard's assessment of risk with any project
is threefold. First is the financial risk. However, he views this
risk in terms of the ante necessary to play the game. "There is
always an element of uncertainty that you can't uncover until you get
into it, but you try not to go for broke."
The most significant risk for Howard is the opportunity cost of
becoming deeply involved in one project at the expense of not pur-
suing others that may have an equal or higher probability of success.
"If you decide to work on the wrong horse you are in trouble." Yet,
despite this concern he works primarily on instinct in the initial
stages of the development process. "If you want to uncover everything
you never start anything. I think the instinct that we have is all
you can go on in the beginning."
Finally, there is the risk of failure. But Howard expresses a very
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pragmatic view of this risk. "Does it mean that you're no good if
you lose one contract - no. But if you lose consistently you have to
begin to question and make room for improvement. You try to minimize
setbacks--but I'm a fighter--you can't take it personally. I'd
rather be wrong in my own than right for somebody else."
Howard is an excellent example of the independent entrepreneur.
The rewards he derives from his company and projects are simple and
direct. "I love the work. I love watching the real growth of a
project--like a child--in a short period of time. I can control that
process and have a direct influence."
An Example of the Development Process. The activity Howard chose
to illustrate his entrepreneurial style in the development process was
a recently completed rezoning of a ninety acre parcel of land located
in southeastern Massachusetts. The parcel sat along Highway 495 at
the location of an interchange that was to be completed in the near
future. The development potential of the site was brought to Howard's
attention by one of his project managers who had done some preliminary
investigation for a case study while a graduate student at Yale.
Howard's initial reaction was that it was a "dynamite location".
Previous development along 495 had shown a strong market for office
and electronics manufacturing, and the future highway access made the
site worth pursuing. He and his team members began obtaining options
on the land. Through a fortunate coincidence, his associate dis-
covered that he knew an area resident which greatly facilitated making
the contacts to negotiate the options. The length of these options
would turn out to be important to the future success of the rezoning
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process. "If it was generally believed that we would need no more
than a one-year option, I added two on to that. You pay for this
protection but you have to leave yourself enough room for setbacks."
With the options in hand, Howard approached the task of obtain-
ing the needed rezoning. The parcel was zoned for residential use
and he needed it rezoned for industrial uses. However, the town
already had two industrial parks: one of which was a toxic
waste facility that had caused a great amount of concern. As a result,
the town had developed a very reactive and suspicious attitude toward
the expansion of industrial land. Formal analysis of the strengths
and limitations of the site and what would exactly be built on it was
minimal. "We didn't have much of a plan at this point. It was simply
the identification of maybe 30 items that had to do with why somebody
would be interested in such a piece of land. I think that your
instincts and general knowledge of the economic situation is all you
can go on at this point." And this instinct was sufficiently strong
to warrant the cost of the options and the investment in an explora-
tory excursion into the rezoning process.
The task of cultivating local support for the project and inter-
nally assessing the political lay of the land was given over to a
recently defeated, yet well-respected, State Senator. Based on the
Senator's informal networking among his contacts in the town, Howard
decided to make a presentation to the local planning commission. The
planning commissioners were assured that within a very short period
of time the project would bring jobs, industry, and most of all
recognition to the town. But this general sales job was all they
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were provided with to make their decision. "We didn't want to tell
them exactly why we wanted the rezoning" says Howard because to be
more specific would only focus their fears: the vote was unanimous
in favor of the rezoning application.
The next step in the process was a general town meeting. "We
felt that with the support of the town fathers (the planning commis-
sion) it was worth a shot. It was strictly a dice roll." But
Howard's confidence proved to be ill-founded. At the town meeting
all of the issues concerning traffic, the pollution of the water
supply, and the density of the development that had been avoided
earlier were raised with a vengeance. The application went down to
defeat by a 60-40 margin.
Ironically, it was only at this point that Howard really began
to analyze the potential of the site and pulled together a team of
consultants. "After that first (town) meeting we really studied the
site and as it turned out it was even better than we had thought. It
corroborated our first initial instincts." It was at this point that
he started the "campaign" in earnest and began preparing for the town
meeting the following year.
The consultant's report established more accurate parameters for
the development of the site. It became clear to Howard that the uses
they could locate there would be of the type and scale necessary to
allay the fears of the town, and the traffic impact. would be
minimal compared to the construction of the interchange itself. But
he did not offer this information directly to the town. Rather,
in an attempt to gain the trust of the fragmented set of interest
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groups and find compromise on their specific demands, he sent his
staff out to meet informally with each of the groups affected by the
project. Each meeting raised a variation on the common themes
mentioned at the town meeting. Through a somewhat contrived negotia-
tion process, the compromise positions (use, height, traffic, access,
etc.) were introduced as deed covenants.
Howard now felt he was prepared for the town meeting, but the
opposition was still very adamant and "they became very sneaky." In
this town, the annual town meeting is in two segments, two weeks apart.
Howard was asked if he would be willing to place his rezoning applica-
tion on the agenda of the latter meeting because the town leaders
needed a little more time to study the issue. He agreed. But at the
first meeting, the issue was raised and voted down in his absence.
The town demanded an independent study to be done before they made
their decision, which could not now occur until the following year.
At this point, Howard had over $250,000 and two years of time
and energy invested in the project. Two setbacks had already been
experienced. A study was in progress that would take months to
complete and that may only raise more issues to be discussed at the
next year's town meeting. It was a decisive moment. Howard decided
to proceed but this time from a different angle: tax revenue.
Howard's lucky break (as he described it) came with the growing
awareness of the towns people as to the effects of the property tax
limitation measure referred to as Proposition 2 1/2. The local paper
was full of debate on personnel layoffs, cutbacks in local services,
and a looming fiscal crisis. His grounds for optimism were further
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bolstered with the completion of the independent study seven months
later. The study corroborated most of the conclusions of Howard's
own study and placed the rezoning issue on a purely political and
emotional plane.
Parallel to the rezoning process, Howard was cultivating interest
among banks and insurance companies for financing. Their reaction to
the project was very positive and they assured him that the money
would be forthcoming if and when he could get the zoning. "At this
risk level and the two setbacks it is unlikely that anyone would even
give you a certificate of breathing, and even if you could convince
them to go along the price would be outrageous." Despite the banks'
caution, their interest provided further support to go ahead.
Howard became determined to pull out all the stops in the
remaining five months before the next town meeting. "We followed a
political strategy from then on out." A professional sociologist
was hired to organize the effort along the lines of a political cam-
paign, and local people were hired to serve as "precinct captains."
Each section of the city was studied to determine useful demographic
information, and attitudes towards cuts in city services. With this
information, a targetted direct-mail and block party campaign was
structured. This campaign focused on the vital contribution that the
proposed industrial development would make to alleviating the crisis
brought about by the loss of tax revenues. "It was the 'cause celebre'
in the town".
The change in strategy worked, at least from Howard's point of
view, and the rezoning application won by an overwhelming majority the
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following June at the town meeting. "But it was a healing victory.
The people who lost were not sore, they accepted the will of the
majority and felt some assurance that their concerns had been
addressed. We now look forward to a cooperative permit process where
we will involve all those people all over again and will not hide
anything."
This concluding comment provides a striking insight into the way
Howard had managed the three year process. It is only after winning
the key victory (zoning) that he is now prepared to show his cards.
Up to this point the project had been marketed to the town by appeal-
ing to its general self-interest (jobs, recognition, and tax revenues)
or through a series of symbolic compromises on items considered
unessential from the point of view of Howard's development intentions.
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Jesse
Background. Jesse, like many entrepreneurs in a public setting,
came to his position indirectly. His early childhood was dominated
by the radical left values of his parents and grandparents. His
parents were active in left political affairs until the mid 1950s
when they, like many others, terminated their affiliation with formal
party organization. However, secular humanism and profound concern
for social injustices continued and provided Jesse the context for
the formation of his own social values. Jesse grew up in a world of
political activism, leftist summer camps, and idealism. However,
these experiences made for contradictory influences on his character.
On the one hand it imbued him with the sense of mission and identifi-
cation with the less fortunate. Yet the extremity of his beliefs
also served to isolate him and demand a personal self-reliance quite
distinct from his desire to participate in the group process of social
change. These two contradictory tendencies (identification with the
plight of the "masses" and the urge for individual initiative) were to
create the personal conflict during his early adulthood and yield the
blended elements of his subsequent entrepreneurial character.
Jesse entered college with the zeal of a reformer. He felt that
something was wrong with the world and radical political theory was
the means to understand what was wrong and guide future action to
correct it. He joined campus socialist organizations and immersed
himself in philosophy and campus politics. But the abstraction of
academic analysis and the insular character of his predominantly
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middle-class campus life soon brought him to a "political crisis."
He dropped out for a year and found his first opportunity for prac-
tical leadership by starting a food coop and a small radio station.
Challenged by this experience and tempered by their relatively minor
impact on his grander ambition for progressive social change, he
returned to college and joined a recently-formed, state-wide, grass-
roots consumer advocacy organization.
Jesse moved up quickly within this new organization, and after
finishing college he became director of the research division. In
this position he formulated basic policy papers, trained the staff in
political organizing techniques and wrote legislation to be intro-
duced in the state legislature. His participation in building the
organization galvanized Jesse's self-confidence in his basic social
values, yet he quickly realized the limitations of his subordinate
position. "A lot of the issues were not my issues. It (the organi-
zation) is a fighting organization but it is not a responsible
organization in the sense that it does not attempt to institution-
alize its victories."
The desire to create an organization that incorporated the demo-
cratic values Jesse aspired to and take the responsibility for
delivering services to its constituents motivated Jesse to pursue an
advanced degree in urban planning at MIT. "I had a plan when I
started and what I'm doing now is remarkably close to that plan."
His plan was to find a situation that had the necessary political and
social ingredients to establish a community-based development organi-
zation. After two years of searching and refining his organizational
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plan, Jesse found his opportunity in a small milltown outside of
Boston.
An older delapidated neighborhood in the town was threatened by
abandonment and the city's desire to reuse the area for the develop-
ment of high-priced housing for its growing number of professionals
attracted by the technology industries. The area is occupied by a
low income, yet fairly cohesive, Hispanic population. An able and
energetic political leadership was emerging within the community, and
when Jesse found the neighborhood, a political organization had been
formed to resist the city's plans to demolish the area and displace
the current population. "They had a vision of what they wanted to
stop, but did not have a vision of what they wanted to build. I had
a vision of what could be built."
With these ingredients, Jesse set out to build an organization
along the lines he first envisioned two years earlier. He formed a
non-profit development corporation and established the existing
political coalition in the neighborhood as its board of directors.
The purpose of the organization was defined to both rehabilitate the
housing in the neighborhood for the people currently living there and
to create a vehicle that would focus on building a political organi-
zation that could challenge the city's long-term development policy.
"I knew it was right and I knew we could do it," Jesse reflects as
he looks back on those early days.
Risks and Rewards. The impetus behind Jesse's entrepreneurial
activity and his principal source of satisfaction is the building of
a permanent organization. "First and foremost I want to see the
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organization built, but it cannot succeed if it doesn't do projects.
I feel I am doing something very important whether anyone recognizes
it or not." Yet, as with most development entrepreneurs, there is
also the desire to produce something tangible. "Fifty percent of
the mornings I wake up saying 'goddamnit I haven't gotten anything
done yet.' The stuff I've done you can't touch - its not a brick and
that is frustrating. I've gotten to the point ideologically that I
am tired of abstractions. This is so real--almost too real. But
there is a certain comfort in very specific task-oriented activities."
Jesse's assessment of the risks associated with entrepreneurial
efforts derive from his broader view of the role of development in
helping people gain control. His emotional investment in making the
organization a success is evident from his actions, and his first
criterion in selecting projects is whether they contribute to this
end." "I'm not really a housing developer. I'm an organization
builder." The risk is that failure to succeed with a particular
project will lead to failure for the more important objective.
At a personal level the risk is not being able to move on to
other challenges. "If I fail here, how do I move on to bigger and
better--I have greater ambitions. I don't see myself moving on to
bigger things until I complete something successful here."
An Example of the Development Process. Jesse's entrepreneurial
style reflects this purpose. His first task was to parley the
political strength of the organization into the financial resources
necessary to acquire and rehabilitate housing. Ironically, the
opportunity to achieve this was created by the city's own actions.
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A major insurance company had initiated a program to provide operating
grants and below market financing for the rehabilitation of older
urban neighborhoods. The city proceeded to set up a dummy organiza-
tion and the city manager announced that the area would be razed and
rebuilt with the financial assistance of the insurance company.
The attempt to side-step Jesse's organization and ignore its
demands raised a furor in the neighborhood which was channelled through
the development corporation. Jesse, along with the assistance of his
board members, made the most of this opportunity. The loose-knit
coalition (made up of nine different neighborhood organizations, two
hispanic groups, four churches, and a covey of social service agencies)
that were affiliated with the corporation was welded into a directed
political force. Within two months, Jesse put together a development
plan for the neighborhood that was consistent with the organization's
goals and presented it to the insurance company. "We had an organiza-
tion, a plan, and dedication. I demonstrated need with a technical
planthat was more sophisticated than what the city had put together."
The victory over the insurance company program gave the organiza-
tion the financial clout and credibility necessary to begin negotiating
for property but it also made powerful enemies within the city. With
this knowledge, Jesse established a two-pronged strategy.
The first was to obtain the options on several buildings and begin
the first development project. But, in spite of the general plan
written for the insurance company grant, Jesse was operating basically
on instincts in making the selection of buildings to rehabilitate.
"It just happened that there were three brothers who wanted to sell
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and we were in the market to buy." He had only a few key pieces of
information at this point in the process: the area was generally
blighted with all buildings in about the same state of disrepair;
the city had some uncommitted subsidy money; and the landlords wanted
to sell. As to formal analysis: "I don't know: we just stumbled on
the buildings." With the assistance of a contracted architect and a
team of housing consultants, Jesse pieced together a 32 unit rehabili-
tation package.
The key to the success of the project was the commitment of sub-
sidy funds controlled by the city: by now no friend of the neighbor-
hood corporation. "I made a personal political analysis at that
point. I decided that the city council was against us but that the
planning director was sympathetic." To bolster this potential internal
ally, he began to develop a personal relationship with the planning
director and to cultivate other sources of support among organizations
close to the city. He found that the directors of the housing authority,
the city sponsored downtown development corporation, and the preserva-
tion commission were all to varying degrees sympathetic. "So I took
all these people and formed a planning group for the neighborhood.
That was probably the smartest move we made to gain legitimacy. I
set the agenda and we had all the right people there." The group
hired a team of architects to put together an overall development
scheme for the area. At about the same time that the planning group
was created, Jesse discovered that the city had a significant sum of
state housing subsidy money that the housing authority had not used
and was about to return it to the state. Jesse approached an
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interested local state senator and told him that if the senator
forced the city council to hold a public hearing on the issue the
coalition would make sure that it would have a large attendance for
which he could take credit. "When I get frustrated with the develop-
ment process I turn to my organizing background" states Jesse.
The public hearing was called, and true to the organization's expec-
tations ("we did our homework") it was the largest public hearing in
the history of the city. Immediately after the hearing, Jesse's
corporation received the need commitment of subsidies by a unanimous
vote of the housing authority.
The victory of the public hearing dramatically improved the
chances for the organization to continue with its development activi-
ties. Soon after, the development plan for the area was completed and
accepted by the planning group as its own. "It was as if a dam broke.
It was a bizarre accident - we were lucky."
Unfortunately for Jesse, he did not realize how long or compli-
cated the process would be and the options on the buildings expired.
He tried to renegotiate the options but the landlords saw an oppor-
tunity to get more money for their buildings. "We were so much in
the press that they all knew what we were going to do." Undaunted
by this setback, Jesse has negotiated with the city to designate the
area an urban renewal district which would force the sale of the
buildings at their fair market value: a sum significantly lower than
what they are now asking.
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Stan
Background. Stan provided relatively little information on his
background, focusing his discussion primarily on his early real estate
ventures to explain his route into the field. Born to an attorney
specialized in real estate, Stan had an early exposure to the instincts
and methods of the business, although he did not follow immediately
in his father's footsteps. Stan began his undergraduate work in pre-
medicine. His pursuit of a career in science and medicine did not
suit his interest in social affairs, and following a six-month tour of
duty in the Air Force Reserves, Stan returned to the Boston area and
enrolled in a political science program. During this period, Stan did
some work in government but decided it was not his calling: "political
science was fun in college, but didn't seem very real after I got out."
These experiences developed in Stan a desire for leadership and
initiative which could not find sufficient outlet. He found the outlet
for his energies by returning to real estate and took a job with a
small, local construction firm specialized in building rehabilitation.
He worked for the firm a short period of time when its owner died and
left Stan with the responsibility of picking up the pieces and con-
tinuing the business. His interest in real estate and his confidence
grew through this experience and he began to seek a position with a
firm that had a wider development scope. Why he chose to become a
development entrepreneur over other possible alternatives or technical
specializations within the field appears to be a matter of circum-
stance. "I just had a job in real estate at the time."
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In the mid '60s, Stan found the company he was seeking: a small
development and rehabilitation firm that remodelled buildings in the
downtown Boston area. Within a couple of years he became the lead
development entrepreneur in the company. It was owned at the time by
two brothers-in-law who were content with its small scale and had
basically lost interest. When one of the brothers left, Stan.and the
other brother took over the company, and Stan launched it into an
ambitious development role.
Stan's opportunity to move the company out of the rehab business
came when he found a large piece of land to the north of Boston that
he felt was perfect for a regional shopping center site. Regional
shopping centers had been experimented with throughout the country
but were still a new idea in New England in the late 60s. Stan saw
this parcel as the opportunity to pioneer the regional shopping
center concept in the greater Boston area. Based on his initial
impression of the site he obtained an option from the land owner.
After several unsuccessful attempts to find a developer, Stan decided
to do it on his own. By 1970 Stan had completed his first 750,000
square feet enclosed regional shopping center and established
himself as a leader in the field.
Out of this development experience, Stan identified the key
ingredients for his future success. The first is to establish long-
term personal relationships within the field. "It's like any other
business, maybe moreso. It's a people business. In real estate you
always talk as if development were bricks and mortar but most of
the time it isn't. It's who you know and what kind of confidence
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they have in you." After his first development success, Stan decided
to specialize in shopping centers and became involved in the
International Council of Shopping Centers. He moved quickly in the
organization from regional director to state director and on to
trustee. The contacts he made in ICSC became the source of many of
his future business partners and shopping center tenants. He developed
similar long-standing relationships among his financial backers.
"Continuity of relationships is the key." Stan's philosophy is that
it is more important to establish permanent relationships among a few
key investment bankers that can be relied on in a pinch rather than
to always look for the best interest rate.
The second ingredient to Stan's formula of success is the
informal, federated structure of his organization. Despite the large
scale of the company's development ventures it has less than thirty
five employees, including support staff. "I put together every
piece of expertise that is necessary so that I can have the flow of
an organization that can move from project to project, but I try to
control overhead by establishing relationships with firms." What
makes this approach unique in Stan's case is that the firms remain
closely affiliated with the main company. Over the years Stan has
fostered the creation of seven companies (architectural, engineer-
ing, leasing, law, marketing, general contracting, and management)
by encouraging acquaintances or members of his own staff to go out
on their own. He retains no ownership in the companies but provides
each with office space in his main building and establishes common
information links among the companies. through interlocking computers.
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Not only does Stan gain the needed flexibility from such an arrange-
ment, he retains the entrepreneurial element in each of the spin-off
companies. Again the key is continuity. "It's almost like having
your own people and they are each tuned in with what we are doing.
Each company is independent, but it really isn't, because of its
affiliation with us." This federated organizational structure allows
Stan to concentrate on hiring the general expertise needed for his
core staff and to coordinate among all units, rather than manage
day-to-day activities. "I don't know anyone else in the country who
is organized as we are."
The third ingredient of his business formula is to enter and
expand previously tested markets. The concept of a regional shopping
center is to capture a geographical market area and establish a form
of local monopoly by discouraging competitors from following. The
risks of failure in entering an untested market on such a scale are
great. The strategy that Stan developed in his first venture to
reduce this risk was to find market areas that already have a small
shopping center, locate near it, and reach out to a broader untapped
market radius with a specialized line of goods not provided by the
existing local shopping center. To achieve this objective, Stan
builds his shopping centers on a scale suitable for a regional market
and seeks major discount stores as his anchor tenants.
Risks and Rewards. Stan is a master gamesman in the development
process and gains great pleasure in watching his strategies lead to
results. "Our idol. is Yogi Bera, who said "the game isn't over until
the game is over. It's a personal thing; it's not like a big
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institution."
For Stan the development process is viewed in human terms, not
physical components. His assessment of the risks involved in his
ventures is based on his desire to preserve the continuity of his
professional contacts. "It's a relationship thing. It's a confidence
level on the part of the people we work with who know that if it's a
tough deal we can do it." To fail would jeopardize this confidence.
On a financial level, Stan follows the entrepreneurial dictum of
using other people's money. As a result he successfully incurs only
a relatively small financial risk to himself and his organization
despite the large scale of his projects. But his long-term ownership
position in each project provides for maximum leverage if he succeeds.
"A regional shopping center that is successful owns the market and it
makes you a lot of money."
An Example of the Development Process. The project selected by
Stan to illustrate both the complexity of the development process and
his strategic style was a recently completed shopping center in New
Hampshire. In the mid '70s, Stan's firm had completed a shopping
center in the south central section of the state. The project was a
success, and Stan saw an article in a business journal that showed
that New Hampshire would continue its rapid population growth and
high level of disposable income through the 1980s. With this infor-
mation and his own experience he began the search for another location.
He found a site along the seacoast that met all of his basic criteria,
and in 1977 obtained the option from the Digital Corporation that had
abandoned its plan to build a facility in the area. Thus would begin
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a four year odyssey.
Stan's initial assessment of the situation led him to believe
that the rezoning and permit process would proceed quickly. It was
a small sleepy town with no professional planning staff. The rezoning
from industrial to retail would not be overly devisive, and he had
a successful project fifty miles away to point to.
Stan's strategy was to approach the local planning board
informally to cultivate support for the project. He prepared a
schematic plan adapted from his other projects and scheduled an infor-
mational meeting with the planning board in the spring of 1978. No
request for action was made at that meeting but within five minutes
the project was voted down. "We went in sleeping. We got some bad
information; we didn't realize that there was this level of opposition."
The planning board was adamant in its opposition. It felt
deceived because it had only two years earlier granted the Digital
Corporation a zoning change from retail to industrial and next they
see a retail proposal. The town had experienced a rapid expansion of
strip commercial development along its main traffic arteries and had
hoped the Digital facility would stem the tide. Also, the leading
figure on the planning board (an older, retired man) was personally
opposed to a project of the scale proposed by Stan.
With this decisive defeat, Stan shifted his strategy. By
chance a selectman and the wife of the chair of the board of selectmen
were in attendance of the meeting on other matters. Stan approached
them and found that, although they were not necessarily in favor of
his project, they were annoyed at the way he was treated by the
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planning board. Stan began to cultivate them as allies and over the
next couple of months convinced the board of selectman to put the
rezoning issue before the town at a special town meeting. The
meeting was scheduled for August 1979.
Over the next year, Stan would discover the full extent of the
complexity that he would have to overcome for his project to succeed:
1. The project would require a curb-cut permit from the state
which allowed the state Department of Public Works to enter the pic-
ture with a list of traffic problems it wished to solve in the area
as a condition of its approval.
2. A separate state permit would also be required under an
indirect source pollution statute.
3. The DPW required a traffic study to be prepared. This study
found that the reconfiguration of a key intersection would overlap
the boundaries of the neighboring town. The intersection plan would
require the approval of this town, which had been an arch enemy of
the first town for years.
4. The federal administration had established a policy that
would allow federal officials to intervene if a town could show that
its downtown renewal program would be threatened by a peripheral
shopping center. The neighboring town had such a renewal program and
was prepared to use the federal policy if necessary.
5. The smaller shopping center in the area realized the compe-
tition that Stan's project would generate and opposed the project.
They hired a traffic consultant to refute the findings of Stan's
consultant.
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6. Two national shopping center developers had purchased options
on sites in the surrounding area and began luring tenants away from
Stan's project on the argument that he would never succeed.
7. Stan's option on the land was running out and he could see
that the financial markets were in such disarray with the growing
recession that,unless he had a major victory on the other issues, it
would be almost impossible to get the financing when the time came
to buy the land.
Stan retained his confidence when faced with the extent of this
distressing information. "in the back of my mind I just kept saying
it was a matter of time and we were going to eventually win the
battle. Before you can get to home plate you have to figure out how
to get from first to second. What you have to do is break it (the
problem) down and come up with a conclusion on each front as to what
your game plan is and then not get locked into a plan so you can
change with the process. We never have a problem because each problem
can be turned into an opportunity."
The first task was to obtain the necessary rezoning at the town
meeting. For this Stan's strategy shifted from informal networking to
the mounting of a public campaign. During the summer of 1978 Stan
rented buses and provided a.shuttle service free.of charge for towns-
people to shop at his other shopping center across the state. Women
were entertained with fashion shows and everyone was treated as special
guests. The shuttle created a general goodwill and overcame many
individual's negative impression of a shopping center. The second part
of this public relations strategy was to direct local concerns toward
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solvable technical aspects of the project and away from total opposi-
tion. For this, Stan continued to attend weekly meetings of the
planning board and reserved the town hall every Friday night to invite
townspeople to discuss the plan. To encourage attendance, personal
letters were sent to every household in the town. Through these
activities, Stan gained the trust of many townspeople and was success-
ful in isolating and addressing their two primary areas of concern:
the traffic problem and the quality of the shopping center.
The town voted sixty percent in favor of the rezoning at the
town meeting: Stan's crucial victory. He now had invested $.5 million
dollars in the deal but felt confident about continuing. "There was
enough feel that interest was mushrooming--we had a shot."
The next obstacle to overcome was the resistance of the neighbor-
ing town to the changes in the intersection. Stan's lawyers dis-
covered a law that required the state commissioner of public works to
arbitrate between two communities in situations such as this and
informed him of this legal responsibility. To encourage the commis-
sioner, Stan agreed to pay the full cost for all the improvements to
the roads in the vicinity as well as the intersection. By this
agreement, Stan had neutralized the commissioner. But knew he would
not get him to act if an agreement was not reached with the town.
Stan found his opportunity when it was discovered that the town, at
the request of the state, had planned an extension to one of its
major thoroughfares, but the town had been unwilling to put up the
local matching funds for the state to secure federal highway
construction funds. In a bold move, Stan agreed to provide the
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$625,000 of matching funds conditional on approval of the intersection
improvements. "All of a sudden the missing link was made. Now the
town was caught in a lock between the state and us. They couldn't
turn it down because they had the money and in the meantime the
commissioner said that if they didn't cooperate with us he was going
to make a determination in our favor." On October 15, 1980 a final
agreement was reached with the town.
During this same period a much more decisive threat emerged:
the option was running out and the landowner demanded that the
property be purchased. Stan was faced with a tough choice and limited
options. He now had over $1 million in the deal. He was gaining
momentum yet he still had none of the key permits and was finding it
difficult to line up tenants. With these problems Stan realized that
even if he decided to seek financing it would be almost impossible
to find in a recessionary economy. Then an opportunity arose, that
in Stan's mind, was the turning point of the project. Over the years
he had developed a personal relationship with several key people in a
large Real Estate investment Trust (REIT) based in New England. The REIT
had never been in development before but decided now was the time to
get in to position for the recovery. Stan showed them his project.
They agreed to purchase the land and form a joint-venture.
Stan now had the clout he needed to continue. "That told every-
body we were real; in a market where nobody had financing we had
financing. We were no longer just a guy with an option in town."
The next step was to obtain approval from the planning board for
the site plan. This would become a test of wills and cunning between
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Stan and the board's chairman. "If I ever have to have a foe I
wouldn't want it to be this guy. He was committed to killing the
project if it took his dying breath, period." Ostensibly the issue
was the mitigation of traffic impacts. Stan had already agreed to
pay for all of the improvements but no determination had yet been
made on what they would be. The planning board decided on a tactic to
make the traffic plan financially infeasible for the project and hired
a consultant from the state Department of Transportation who was
opposed to shopping centers. Stan brought in his own traffic consul-
tants and the war of reports began.
During this period Stan succeeded in obtaining the indirect
source permit. He had already gone through the process with his
previous development but knew that he had to repeat the study to con-
vince the state regulatory agency that the statute was not applicable
to a regional shopping center. Stan had hired an environment
engineering firm and spent $50,000 to make his case. Once made, the
permit was automatic.
In May 1981, Stan had to get the project under construction soon
or he would lose his anchor tenants to his competitors. "We decided
that we'd had enough of the planning board. We had to go for "the
kill." His strategy was to isolate the chairman and cultivate
support among the other members of the board. An attorney with a
reputation for toughness was hired for the project and to build the
evidence for a court case against the chairman. The attorney hired
a court stenographer and brought him to each weekly board meeting
to record the comments and actions of the chairman. At this point
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the chairman was running out of delay tactics and beginning to resort
to more arbitrary actions: making false statements about the project
that would take weeks to investigate, and scheduling meetings at odd
times (e.g., Friday before the 4th of July) to discourage Stan's
attendance.
Such tactics made the other members of the commission increasing-
ly uneasy. They knew the attorney was getting exactly what he needed
for his court case. To encourage their estrangement from the chairman,
Stan made the conciliatory gesture of offering his traffic consultants
free of charge to work on a wide range of local traffic problems that
the town otherwise would not have the resources to address. The other
board members were mollified by the move and decided to bring an end
to the battle of wills. On July 2, 1981 they approved the site plan
and authorized the issuance of the building permit with all of the
conditions agreed to earlier. In the end, Stan had spent $150,000 in
traffic studies and had agreed to make $2.5 million in traffic
improvements in the vicinity of the project.
However, Stan's problems were not over. He now had to obtain a
zoning variance from the board of adjustments, before the building
permit could actually be issued. Confident that this would be a
simple matter, he began site work (which did not require the
plan approval) for the project immediately. On July 31, the last day
of the appeal period for planning board approval, the adjacent shopping
center filed suit against the board's approval of the site plan
arguing that their traffic consultants had found that the project
consultant and the state had used the wrong technical information.
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The owners of the adjacent shopping center had maneuvered against the
project behind the scenes for some time and this was a last ditch
effort for delay. ut it was too late; too many important people in
the shopping center world (major tenants, financiers, and leasing
agents) were involved. If the project failed at this point they would
look foolish. Stan, through his contacts, started to put pressure on
them to drop the suit. "They hadn't realized that it is one thing to
be an outsider but when you are on the inside playing with the same
guys it would be to their detriment if a bunch of regional managers
(for the tenant stores) ended up looking bad." On August 27, 1981,
a meeting was arranged in New York to negotiate a deal. Stan's group
agreed to pay $250,000 for them to drop the suit. On September 18
the variance was approved and the building permit issued.
The shopping center opened in February 1983.
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Edward
Background. Edward came to his entrepreneurial role by way of
a variety of experiences that instilled in him a fundamental interest
in the way things work. Neither the zeal of a reformer nor the urge
for autonomy characterize his early years. Born in Brooklyn to parents
of modest means, he grew up on the streets where he gained a first-hand
exposure to the complexities of urban life and a basic respect for
people. People like his parents who retained their pride and dignity
with little more to work with than their integrity and will to survive.
"I have some feelings about the inequities in our society, and I try,
as an individual, to deal with them through my occupation and other
activities. However, I never had the orientation that God whispered
in my ear."
Brooklyn was also a place of politics, power and corruption.
Edward's early explorations of the world beyond his neighborhood
opened his eyes to the affairs and abuses of government. Being an
inquisitive youth he began to investigate these affairs and thus
began his life-long fascination with government. "I joined the
Democratic Party not to make great changes or to right wrongs--I was
interested in the political process."
Edward was a precocious youth. He graduated high school at
sixteen and entered the University of Pennsylvania intending to major
in government. Following his undergraduate work he returned to New
York to enroll at Columbia in the School for International Affairs.
Edward's progress toward a career in government was diverted when he
60
became a copy boy at the New York Times. It was then that he found
an outlet for his interest in government and went on to become a
journalist. After several years at the Times, he was offered a job
at a major newspaper in Boston and assigned to cover city hall.
Despite his shunning the reformer label, Edward proved to be an
astute and critical observer of the political machinations within
city government. During his tenure as a journalist, he developed a
personal relationship with a recently appointed and reform-minded
director of the Boston Redevelopment Authority. This director had
also been a reporter and the two had a natural affinity. Edward was
offered the job as special assistant to the BRA director and assigned
to serve as project manager on a major downtown renewal area. This
was his first exposure to development; albeit from an administrative
and planning point of view. After several years in this position,
Edward moved on to work in the planning and development department
of a major local university and subsequently served as a consultant
to the Massachusetts Port Authority. Each of these experiences added
to Edward's general understanding of the complexity of the development
process but did not place him in a direct entrepreneurial position.
"I've been entrepreneurial, I suppose, because I've wandered into
these things and I've happened to do things I enjoy. I never thought
about development in the beginning. I've just always been interested
in government."
It was during this latter period that the administrative and
strictly political nature of his interests would change. Just before
joining the staff at Massport, Edward became involved with a private
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real estate venture in a town outside of Boston. Within this small
development team, he gained his first exposure to real estate entre-
preneurship. The team organized a $20 million dollar residential
project which included optioned land, financing, engineering studies,
architectural plans, and most importantly a federal Urban Development
Action Grant. Unfortunately, the development required a zoning
variance from the city which was ultimately denied contributing to
the failure of the project. Edward was humbled by this experience,
but it gave him valuable information for the future. "Putting that
project together was very critical in my knowledge of the development
process and in understanding what has to happen." Concurrent with
the private development deal, Edward was offered a permanent position
at Massport, placed in charge of underutilized properties, and given
a "fairly vague job descriptioon." He was now thoroughly interested
in development and spent several months assessing his options among
the various parcels owned by the Authority and chose to initiate the
redevelopment of a decaying fish pier facility.
Risks and Rewards. Like many developers, Edward's principal
reward is simply succeeding with the project. "I enjoy being able to
go down in a comparatively short period of time and seeing things
happen. I love working on the fish pier." But there is more to hi.s
gratification than watching construction proceed. "I hope there will
be more than just the construction. I want very much to see the experi-
ment of the pier succeed. That we get a major change in the operation
(the processing innovations he helped introduce) and that we get an
organizational structure (among the dealers, processors, and boat
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captains) put of it. that will insure that the operation will' be
improved."
The career risks on this project were enormous for Edward. it
was his opportunity to head a major development deal. But he also
knew that the Massport bureaucracy would be unforgiving if he failed.
"Bureaucracies tend to become conservative: you don't look bad if
you don't do anything. I've made several mistakes and the bureaucracy
can be quite tyrannical about errors. When there is no institutional
commitment to do these things it becomes personal."
An Example of the Development Process. Although Edward does
not really view himself as an entrepreneur, the fish pier example will
illustrate many of the same characteristics found in complex develop-
ment situations. He began the process by making a preliminary politi-
cal assessment. "As often happens in the public sector, there was a
crisis that focused attention on the authority. The fish dealers
were angry because the building was falling down around their ears and
the facility was losing money." This crisis for the Authority was the
opportunity Edward needed to initiate the redevelopment project for
the pier.
The Authority had commissioned two studies of the pier's poten-
tial prior to his arrival that served as the basis for determining a
development plan. "One proposed a Faneuil Market concept and was
poorly done and the other proposed the redevelopment of the pier for
the fishing industry but was not very detailed." Edward made his
decision, based on this limited information, to pursue the latter
option for several reasons:
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1. The shopping mall idea was better suited in the downtown
area where it began.
2. Congress had recently passed the "200 mile limit" which
would reduce foreign competition for the Boston based fish-
ing boats.
3. The fishing industry was very job intensive with the kind
of blue collar jobs Boston needed.
4. The industry had a long history on the pier and Boston
still served as a major distribution center.
With no further analysis, the decision was made to proceed. "I just
felt we could succeed with the renovation of the fish pier -as a fish
pier. That judgement proved successful."
The plan Edward proposed, however, was more than just a blueprint
for a bricks and mortar project. The plan called for a mix of fish
processing and office uses. The rents from the office space would be
used to subsidize the rents for the fish dealers. It also called for
the complete restructuring and modernization of the facility to intro-
duce several cost-saving innovations in fish processing practices: an
aspect of the plan for which Edward assumed primary leadership.
The rudiments of a plan in hand, Edward began to lay out his
strategy for implementation. The crucial financial element for the
plan to succeed was funding from the federal Economic Development
Administration, but to obtain this Edward would need the policy and
financial commitment of the authority. His approach to this task was
to rely on his own persuasiveness and knowledge of the organization.
"I identified a series of influential folks and I persuaded these
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people on a one-to-one basis--the formal meeting came only after I
had predetermined what was to happen. I worked the individuals
first--the power centers--the chairman of the board, the executive
director and the director of administration and finance." Next came
his peers in the organization, and for these individuals he had to
appeal to their technical nature. For this purpose he prepared a
formal position paper and circulated it within the Authority. Although
a necessary device for gaining their support, Edward concludes "that
the position paper was less important than the politicking that I did."
The internal networking completed, a formal meeting was organized to
discuss the options for the fish pier. As expected, they accepted
Edward's renovation plan and rejected the other options.
A commitment from the board of directors was the next step.
However, Edward was cautious not to ask for too much at this first
meeting. The board was simply briefed on the staff discussions and
conclusion, and asked to make only a tentative commitment to the
project - no vote was requested or taken. The acquiescence of the
board was essential to begin negotiations with all of the external
actors and for Edward to gain claim to the internal resources
necessary to begin building his staff. This he received.
The strategy, at this point, segmented into three component parts
(one each for the users of the pier, the city, and the federal govern-
ment) to be pursued simultaneously. The users of the pier facility
were not a cohesive group at the beginning of this process. There
were fresh fish processors, frozen fish processors, fish brokers,
shellfish distributors, frozen storage operators, and the boat captains
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each with their own interests and concerns. "It took some cultivating
but the basis of an organization was there (with the exception of the
boat captains) and good leadership emerged. The boat captains just
thought we were whacko but were not essential."
The two issues that seemed to cut across all of the groups were
the level of rent that would be demanded after the renovations and the
design of the facility. However, the dealers were in a bit of a quan-
dry on these issues since it was they who had demanded the improvements
in the facility, and they knew as a result the rents would have to be
increased. They accepted Edward's plan to keep their rents low by
diverting revenue from the office space. Following initial negotia-
tions on the rent level they focused their attention on the design.
Edward involved the dealers in every phase of the design process.
Trips were organized to visit facilities throughout New England to
gather information and ideas. Through this sincere willingness to
take their concerns as his own and translate them into the plan,
Edward gained the stalwart support of the dealers.
Edward needed the support of the city for two reasons: 1) the
city had to sign-off on the EDA grant application of the pier project,
and 2) a number of permits and approvals would be necessary to imple-
ment the project. Gaining this support would not be a major problem
for Edward due to the number of contacts he had maintained from his
BRA days. "The initial foray into the city was based on my contacts,
but these had to be broadened to deal with a variety of institutional
approvals which required the usual briefings, letters, and publicity,"
all of which were now easily obtained.
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The federal government would be a different matter however.
Edward had had little exposure to the federal bureaucracy or the
congressional delegation in his previous activities. "The strategy
was to understand them and how to get the maximum amount of money out
of them. The problem was that they were not making their decision
on the merits of the project." With this knowledge, Edward divided
his task in two parts. First, he had to convince the technicians at
EDA that the project met their statutory criteria. "We felt, and
were able to prove, that there would be an enormous number of jobs
produced by the project. Which, of course, was what EDA was supposed
to do." The technicians required reams of additional information
(four book length proposals were produced over the two years it would
take to make their decision), but the jobs piece was what formed the
basis of his arguments.
The second task was to gain the interest of the congressional
delegation and persuade them to bring pressure on the EDA. Edward
found that the congressional representative in whose district the pier
was located was very interested in the project. He took the lead in
organizing the delegation and advocating for the requested funds from
EDA. Unfortunately, for Edward, the amount of money he needed was
more than they were willing to give at one time. The political com-
promise on this issue was to divide the project into two discrete
developments. Though politically necessary, this compromise became
one of the principal sources of cost overrun and added two years to
the length of the project. "We lost the economy of scale."
Both grants were ultimately received, and the fish pier was
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retained for the fishing industry. Six years older and very much the
wiser, Edward reflects "you have to assume a high level of difficulty
for a project like this. However, we were able to coordinate all
these entities and keep things going.'
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Adam
Background. Adam was born, as an only child, to an affluent
family in Cuba. "I was a spoiled child accustomed to living the
well-travelled, comfortable good life." Adam's easy and enjoyable
childhood made choosing a profession a difficult decision. He
knew he was ambitious and independent but he also wished to preserve
his lifestyle. His father was a prominent businessman in the country
with interests in real estate development, a finance company, and a
venture capital company. But Adam's idea for a career and his
interest in construction come from his aunt who was a successful
structural engineer and architect.
Adam chose civil engineering as his specialty and enrolled in
the University of Havana. However, his studies were brought abruptly
to an end when the school was closed during the political unrest of
the early Castro years. When the school closed, he returned to work
with his father for a year on one of his real estate development
projects as a heavy equipment operator. This experience confirmed
Adam's interest in construction. When the family fled Cuba following
the revolution, Adam enrolled at MIT to resume his studies. He
shifted his emphasis from civil engineering to construction materials
and continued his studies through a master's degree. However, his
technical studies made him realize that the field was ill-suited for
his entrepreneurial energy. "I always leaned toward civil engineering
until I came here and saw what it was all about and decided that was
not what I wanted to do. I didn't have the patience to go through the
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design process." This attitude and the arrival of his second child
convinced Adam that it was time to seek employment.
He was offered a job with a small but growing construction
company in the Boston area as a construction estimator. Adam moved up
quickly in the company. As it grew from 15 to 120 employees during
his seven year tenure, he was given more and more latitude to make
deals. "I really got into development through the back door. I liked
the package (design/build) deals and was given alot of the negotiated
work." Adam's negotiating ability and detailed knowledge of construc-
tion was recognized by the owners and he was placed in charge of the
newly established office in Washington, D.C.
The company expanded rapidly and by 1979 was the eighth largest
building construction contractor in the country. Nevertheless, the
company was not interested in moving into development, and Adam became
more and more constrained in his desire to take on new challenges.
His break came when an associate told him that Honeywell could not
find a developer that could design and build a small facility within
their budget. While only in his late 20s, Adam threw himself into
the breach and structured a deal that not only met their budget but
came in under target. "I pulled it off with flair, showed initiative
and creativity, and made a bundle of money."
Adam's flair and hardnosed determination caught the eye of
development company that built office parks in the Highway 128 area.
He was offered the position of vice president and project manager.
Adam stayed with the company six years and during this time
reorganized the construction division, formed a subsidiary management
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company, and eventually became vice president in charge of overall
operations. After these experiences it was time to go on his own.
"The owners were running the company like a non-profit organization
which used to exasperate someone like me because I am very bottom-line
oriented. The company had too large of an overhead and too many
meetings."
With $25,000 in cash borrowed from an uncle and a second mortgage
on his home, Adam launched his development company from a 200 square
foot office. Although Adam served in entrepreneurial capacities in
his previous positions, they were mostly internal to the companies
and he had had relatively little exposure to the range of actors he
would have to deal with as an independent. "I think the toughest
thing in my decision to go out on my own was to have enough confidence
that I could do it alone and in particular gain the confidence of the
banks."
As an entrepreneur, Adam is relatively risk averse. The structure
of his company reflects this attitude. The company is organized as
both a development and a general contracting firm and specializes in
projects of the small end of the scale. His basic business principals
are:
1. balance risky development deals with solid, dependable con-
struction contracts.
2. structure each deal to spread risk among a number of joint
venture partners.
3. specialize in small projects.
4. delegate initiative to staff to encourage entrepreneurship
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but personally retain final decision-making authority.
Risks and Rewards. Adam is a straightforward private entre-
preneur and his assessment of risks and rewards reflect both his
attitude toward his relationship with his company and to the indivi-
dual project. "It feels good to do your own thing and be your own
boss: to take a raw piece of land and in a short period of time see
a beautiful project." No grander values are expressed in his view of
development and none are sought. Apart from the financial reward of
being a successful developer/builder in his own right, independence
and personal sense of conquest are the chief rewards for Adam. But
therein lies the source of his greatest risk. "Reputation is what we
are selling. In this respect I don't think we could afford to fail.
That is why I try to be so damn conservative."
An Example of the Development Process. Adam chose to discuss
two projects to illustrate his entrepreneurial style. Adam's approach
to real estate development was formed by his engineering background.
He viewed every deal as a complex structure of partners, tenants,
landowners, and his company. Adam gains his greatest pride in custom-
engineering each deal to minimize risk and overcome obstacles. His
first development opportunity came when a friend approached him with
an option on a piece of land and an tenant interested in a 40,000
square feet building. The deal had all the right ingredients for Adam
to demonstrate his development capacity, unfortunately he had no
money. He had developed a relationship with a major bank but his lack
of experience led them to require a payment and performance bond before
they would lend on the project. With his years of experience, the
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requirement of a bond on such a riskless small project incensed Adam.
"I'll be damned if I'll pay an insurance company to tell the bank that
I'm O.K."
Adam had little previous background in real estate finance but
this was the challenge he was looking for. He finalized the lease
with the major tenant for two thirds of the building. He then turned
around and presold enough of the project to a pension fund to cover
construction costs. He knew that even with this arrangement he would
need some equity for the bank to provide a construction loan so he
sought out a joint venture partner. In his previous job, he had
developed a relationship with a real estate broker who had a substan-
tial amount of investment capital. Adam offered him a major interest
in the deal if he would come in as a silent partner. Adam, at this
point, was not concerned with how much of the project he had to
bargain away; his only interest was to structure a successful deal
and establish his track record. "All I had were mirrors. The trick
is to keep them pointed in the right direction."
He returned to the bank confident that he would now be able to
waive the bond and obtain the construction financing. The bank
turned him down. Undaunted, Adam searched among the bank contacts
he had made over the years and found one willing to finance the
project.
The second project Adam chose to discuss was the development of
an assembly facility for a computer manufacturer north of Boston.
A 34-acre parcel of land was brought to Adam's attention by a real
estate broker. His decision to become involved in the project was
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based primarily on his instincts. The analysis of feasibility was not
based on economics but on his understanding of the people who might
be involved as the project unfolded. The parcel was located next to
a Honeywell plant. Honeywell a few years earlier decided to shift
its facilities policy from ownership to long-term leasing. Adam
figured that his personal relationship with the company from previous
years would allow him to negotiate a leasing arrangement for future
expansion if he was unable to find an alternative tenant.
The second important element of the deal was that the land was
owned by a wealthy doctor. To minimize his own risk, Adam approached
the landowner with the proposition that they form a joint-venture.
The value of the land serving as the doctor's investment in the deal.
This arrangement allowed Adam to tie up the land without paying for
it directly. "You have to psych out your partner in a joint venture.
This guy was wealthy and didn't need money in the short-term."
Again, to minimize risk, he then had to find a tenant willing
to enter into a long-term lease prior to construction. He found such a
company , but the deal had three complications. First the company's
immediate space need was only 70,000 square feet but it wanted the
ability to expand to 200,000 square feet in a three-stage development
sequence. This requirement was relatively easy for Adam to meet.
The joint-venture with the landowner meant that he would have no
carrying costs on the remaining land during the waiting period and
the phasing of the project would reduce exposure to risk by inde-
pendently financing the phases. The second complication in the deal
was that the company wanted to own the completed facility and Adam's
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deal with the doctor was based on his need for tax shelter not a major
capital gain. The solution to both of these problems was to subdivide
the property, plan the construction of the facility in three 70,000
square feet sections, and provide the company with a short-term lease
and an option to buy each section in sequence.
The last requirement of the company was the most problemmatic.
The parcel was relatively isolated and its only legal access was through
a residential area to the bank of the property. The company requested
a frontage access which required a special permit from the locality and
exposed the project to local politics. Based on his conviction that
he could obtain the necessary approval, Adam completed the six month
lease negotiation and finalized the deal with all parties.
His strategy to obtain the special access permit consisted of
pitting the neighborhood to the back of the property against the city's
planning board. He approached the neighborhood informally to demon-
strate the traffic impact the project would have on the residents if
he used the legal access. "I tried to use that political problem to
gain support for the access to the front." The strategy worked and
the planning board issued the permit but the new access road now had
to pass through a small cluster of houses on the main road. "Then we
had the perennial objector."
One resident across the street from the project filed an appeal
and another also threatened a suit. Adam wanted to avoid a controversy
and took a very pragmatic monetary approach to solving the problem.
The objection from the resident across the street was initially the
headlights and noise of cars entering and leaving the project, but
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this was only a ploy to negotiate a sale as a resettlement. "It
became apparent that what the guy really wanted was to move to the
Cape and retire." He demanded $200,000 to drop his appeal although
the estimated value of the house was only $50,000. "I wasn't going
to let myself be blackmailed, at least not to that extent." But Adam
continued to negotiate and finally bought the house for $65,000
Adam took a much more creative approach with the property owner
who threatened the suit. The new access road for the project was
quite long and required a greater investment than Adam felt appro-
priate for the project. However, the new road also passed along the
border of his opponent's fifteen acre parcel. Adam recognized an
opportunity to solve both problems. The acquisition of the land would
buy out the opposition and allow for the construction of another
facility which would spread the cost of the road over a larger project.
An offer was made to buy the land but was rejected by the owner. Adam
regrouped and took another approach.
Permanent financing had been sought from the state industrial
Finance Agency (MIFA). However, the agency had a $10 million limita-
tion for any one developer in the same locality, and Adam discovered
that for the project to qualify no partner could own more than 50
percent of the deal. To overcome this obstacle Adam and the doctor
transformed a portion of their real estate holding into a stock owner-
ship in the tenant company. But this arrangement was only a partial
solution. A deal with the neighboring landowner became the key for
the necessary divestment. He was offered a swap; his land for an
interest in the project. The deal worked and the final piece of
76
the puzzle fell into place.
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Peter
Background. Peter is a man of extremes. His sense of place,
his commitment to work, and his vision of people taking control over
their lives all have roots in his midwestern upbringing. His father
was a newspaper reporter in a small mid-western otwn and an observer
politics. However, Peter gained his values from another source of
midwestern tradition: rural individualism. Contrasting the social
and political world of his father with the simple virtues of the
independent farmer and the country landscape he chose landscape archi-
tecture as his profession. But he did not shun people, rather he
developed a profound respect for the common man and a disdain for what
he viewed as "society's" ability to transform people into uncaring,
dependent individuals isolated and fearful of one another.
Peter felt strongly that the physical environment was the key to
reconnect people with the harmony of nature and enrolled in college in
a landscape architecture program. His training in spacial principles
heightened his visual grasp of the world. After college he moved
to the Boston area, and during a five year period worked with several
local architectural firms. Peter's self-confidence and desire to be
creative grew, but he found his position did not provide an adequate
outlet for his energies. "There are very few opportunities in the
structured world to think and act creatively: to live at the edge, to
know what you've got and to test your ability."
Despite this feeling about the "structured world," Peter decided
his path to a more creative role required further education and
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enrolled in a graduate program in landscape architecture. It was here
that he would discover the limits of his spacial approach to solving
social problems. "Harvard was doing strange things with computer
based land-use planning. One of my startling first impressions was of
people who spent their whole life perceiving the environment and then
ignoring all its complexity. They were busy rationally diagramming,
weighing, and averaging it all out." With a shock, Peter realized
that his ideas, when pushed to extreme, excluded the human element
and became entirely removed from the fundamental relationship of
people to place. This realization also contradicted the knowledge he
had gained from his father on the social and political complexity of
a community beyond the purely spacial. "The spacial context is very
important, but it took a long time to get beyond my spacial training
and discover the social aspects of the world."
The conflict between the spacial and the social, and Peter's
desire to integrate the two, led him to take his first entrepreneurial
action. The neighborhood where he lived at the time had experienced
decades of neglect, racial tensions, and abandonment. It was a
depressed area with a negative view of itself and its future. Think-
ing of the pioneers from his rural roots who carved a life out of the
wilderness, Peter could not accept the fatalism of the area. He
organized a group of like-minded people and initiated an oral history
project. "We wanted the neighborhood to be understood. We tried to
capture its differences while highlighting the common bonds among its
people."
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Peter became director of the project and the group formed a non-
profit corporation to raise funds. The project produced a booklet
containing 35 short vignettes written by people in the neighborhood
about their visual and social perceptions. The booklet was successful
in bringing together all segments of the community around a common
enterprise and in producing a positive statement in its potential: but
what would follow? "Our vision at the outset was a one-shot deal.
But at the time abandoned housing was the number one issue in the
neighborhood."
Peter found himself propelled into doing something about this
abandoned housing issue. "We had the corporation, the initiative and
an understanding of the problem. It just seemed like the next thing
to do. But we had no experience and no money." With this sobering
fact in mind, Peter created a development corporation out of that
established for the research project. "The general perception was
that we were crazy."
Risks and Rewards. The development corporation has provided
Peter with the opportunity to combine the individualistic values of
his rural roots with his desire to create change. "The real reward
is seeing people help themselves. Most of the people we work with
are very able, hoping people; they just don't have enough money.
They just need a little information and a hand." His second reward
is feeling that he has a role in his adopted neighborhood he now calls
home. "I have no power but as time goes on I have influence."
The risks of his enterprise are viewed in both organizational and
personal terms. The overriding objective of the organization is to
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build confidence in the neighborhood and to stimulate others to also
begin to acquire and rehabilitate its vacant and abandoned housing.
On the one hand, the failure to succeed with one of its projects would
jeopardize success on the more important objective, i.e., if they
can't do it with all of their connections and dedication how can I
possibly hope to succeed? On the other hand, the nature of all of the
projects that the corporation takes on is so fundamentally risky that
it seems hard for Peter to worry about.
The principal risk for Peter is in his own lifestyle. In the
five years of the corporation's existence it has raised less than
$50,000 which includes the cost of acquiring buildings and Peter's
salary. "Money doesn't mean that much to.me but:t don't want to worry
about creditors forever. In the back of my mind I think I'm looking
at it in the larger term. But if I ever sat down in the beginning and
said where I want to go is here and I need to do all these things to
get there I probably would not have started.
"I am continually amazed at the amount of energy that even the
most simple change takes."
An Example of the Development Process. Unlike many non-profit
corporations, Peter's was not a membership organization. "I have
limited faith in broad, participatory action because most of the
things we get involved in are high risk. If I have seven or eight
bright, committed people who will go with me that is all I need and
can handle." The initial function of the corporation was to simply
advocate on behalf of people who wanted to purchase and renovate
abandoned property. "Our first objective was to create a system
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through which the houses could move." To achieve this objective,
Peter organized a group of non-profit organizations in the neighborhood
and formed a separate corporation for the conveyance of abandoned
property which was to serve as a vehicle for negotiating tax abatements
from the city (in many cases it was found that abandoned property
could not be reacquired due to accumulated back taxes amounting to as
much as $50,000) and loans with local banks.
Peter's development corporation, on the other hand, got more
involved in the direct acquisition and rehabilitation of buildings.
"The rest of it was pure guts: the willingness to enter the game with
no certainty that it would come out successfully, and a faith in myself
and my board to deal with the problems as they arose." Peter chose one
of the organization's most recent projects to illustrate its entre-
preneurial style.
Peter woke up one morning to discover that a demolition company
had arrived at the abandoned six-unit apartment house across the
street. The building was physically sound but the city had placed a
$23,000 tax lien on the property and the bill was growing rapidly
whether the building was occupied or not. The owner wanted to remedy
this situation by tearing it down. Peter ran across the street,
asked the demolition crew to delay its work, contacted the owner, and
purchased the building on the spot for $500.
For Peter, this building was more than just another opportunity
for an ad hoc rehabilitation project. It was to become the symbolic
centerpiece for initiating the institutional structure necessary to
take a comprehensive approach to abandoned properties. This possi-
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bility occurred to Peter quite by accident. Peter had had several
dealings with the staff at the state Attorney General's office on
previous properties. When he approached them shortly after acquiring
the six family building, he was put in contact with the Government
Land Bank (a state sponsored development finance agency). The Land
Bank had recently developed an interest in assisting the return of
abandoned property in the inner city to productive use. This was the
ally Peter needed: a finance source willing to take an overall view
of its role in solving the problem. "The Land Bank was the only
agency willing to taks the risk of failure not just a financial risk.
They understand the importance of the project's success."
The alliance with. the Land Bank was the key Peter needed to
formulate his strategy to approach the city and local banks. Several
local banks had shown an early interest in the work of the corpora-
tion. They had provided construction financing and permanent mort-
gages but always on a property by property basis and only after
Peter was successful in negotiating a tax abatement with the city.
They were reluctant to give more of a commitment to Peter's risky
ventures for fear that the city may not make the necessary task
abatement. The Land Bank's commitment to provide the permanent
take-out financing for the construction lenders solved one of these
problems.
With the Attorney General's Office, the Land Bank, local banks,
and the local conveyance corporation behind him, Peter was now ready
to tackle the city. The city had been under pressure to modify the
administrative nightmare of its abatement process for the reclamation
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of abandoned buildings for several years. It had always resisted
these reform efforts on two grounds: one reasonable, the other
unreasonable. The reasonable argument was thatif the abatement process
was too easy, people would stop paying their taxes and wait to get an
abatement when they wanted to sell. The second reason for resisting
the changes in procedures was that it threatened the individual pre-
rogatives of the tax assessor.
The strategy used by the group to overcome this resistance was
twofold. First, using Peter's projects as an example, the group
focused only on property already abandoned acquired by owner-occupants
(not speculators) and non-profit rehabilitation organizations. The
limited, defined scope of this approach made it acceptable to several
important allies within the city government. Peter and other members
of the group, began to formalize the effort. "We eventually assembled
everybody but the tax assessor who was the key. But the organization
gave us enough of an institutional momentum to bring him around and
set up the abatement program."
After two years of work, Peter could now return to his project.
"I'm really just a small time builder, but I also perceive myself as
change-maker in the financial and bureaucratic systems which have
impended the development and redevelopment of this neighborhood."
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BASIC ENTREPRENEURIAL TASKS IN REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT
Real estate development is rarely observed explicitly in entre-
preneurial terms. Some works on the subject serve as partial illus-
trations of entrepreneurship but fail to provide a comprehensive
analysis of entrepreneurial activity. Biographies of prominent figures
in the development world provide the most general source of information
on the relationship between the development entrepreneur and the develop-
ment process. A review of the life and pattern of actions of indi-
viduals who played a decisive role in altering the character of urban
development sheds some light on the methods and requirements for the
implementation of real estate projects. But these biographies are
typically the stories of "great men" whose experiences have little
relevance to those who function in more humble settings. Few general
conclusions or guidelines may be drawn from their experiences and still
fewer are offered. Entrepreneurship becomes in this context a simple
description of the actions of those who are identified as entrepreneurs.
A second source of instruction on entrepreneurship in real estate
can be found in studies of project finance. 12 The proactive forward-
looking characteristics commonly associated with entrepreneurship are
llExamples of instructive biographies include: William Zechendorf
(with Edward McCreary), Zechendorf (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Win-
ston, 1970); Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker (New York: Vintage Books,
1974); and a few short vignettes are provided in Arthur Weimer, et al.,
Real Estate, pp. 25-29.
12Though studies of project finance rarely use the terms of entrepre-
neurship they provide at least some insight into creative initiative
and sustained confidence in the face of doubt.
85
expressed through the compelling promotion of novel financial schemes.
This activity is frequently within the direct domain of the developer
and requires a great amount of initiative and risk. Nevertheless,
creative project finance is only one of many technical and organiza-
tional activities that must be initiated and orchestrated by the
development entrepreneur. Studies of this form indicate'the
type of entrepreneurial behavior illustrated in the technical model
and suggest too narrow a role for entrepreneurship in development.
A more comprehensive and systematic assessment of entrepreneur-
ship in real estate development is, however, not wholly surprising.
Any discussion of the subject suffers from the somewhat fragmented
and ambiguous definition the term has accumulated over time. Economic
histories often adhere to the "great man" theory and point to figures
such as Andrew Carnegie or Alexander Bell as examples of entrepreneurs.
And small business analysts consider anyone who starts a new company
as an entrepreneur. Examples such as these often appear to obscure the
basic tasks of entrepreneurship by focusing on the personal attributes
of the individual. "If we bring the entrepreneur as a person, front
and center, just who is it we are talking about? Is he the man who
conceives of a potential new business? Is he the man who promotes the
relationships necessary for the new business to come into existence?
Is he the consolidator? Is he the man who administers and operates
the organization once established? Is he the man who risks his
capital in new ventures?" 13
1 3Orvis Collins and David Moore, The Organization Makers: A
Behavioral Study of Independent Entrepreneurs (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1970, p.B.
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Depending on which of these interpretations one choses as the
basis of entrepreneurship the character of the entrepreneurial task
will differ. In other words, entrepreneurship becomes whatever one
does who is identified as an entrepreneur. Nevertheless, the litera-
ture in entrepreneurship provides an insight into several generalized
tasks that can be applied to the entrepreneurial experiences expressed
in the case studies.
In this section, four basic entrepreneurial tasks suggested by the
case studies will be discussed --tasks which are consistent with what
the literature generally describes as entrepreneurship. Operationally,
these include:
1. Organization Building. The entrepreneur must build an or-
ganization that can provide him or her with sufficient
autonomy and resources to personally mold events to suit the
desired outcome.
2. Risk Control. The risks associated with an entrepreneurial
action are high. Constructing an organization around oneself
to achieve a specific end forces the individual to assume
primary responsibility for the success or failure of a project.
The entrepreneurial task is to achieve a reciprocal relation-
ship between the amount of risk actually born by the entre-
preneur and the level of uncertainty.
3. Seizing Opportunity. Entrepreneurship is basically an assembly
task. Each new project or venture must assemble and orches-
trate a vast array of hitherto unrelated human, political, and
financial resources. At every stage of the entrepreneurial
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action, from inception to completion, latent opportunities
will exist to catalyze events and draw together these
resources. It is a basic entrepreneurial task to accurately
perceive and seize these opportunities.
4. Positive Projection. During much of the implementation pro-
cess, the development entrepreneur is the only one who sus-
tains confidence in the venture. It is not by plan that the
entrepreneur sustains confidence in the achievability of a
project, but rather by an ability to see how events may be
set in motion that will incrementally accumulate to yield
the positive conditions for the success of the venture, The
basic entrepreneurial task is to effectively convey this
positive projection of what might be possible to sustain his
or her less stalwart and imaginative colleagues.
Organization Building
A central theme in the research on entrepreneurship is the process
of building a new organization. Early research on the subject of the
entrepreneur by Joseph Schumpeter suggests that organization building
consists of catalyzing "new combinations" in an economic system through
the introduction of innovation. For Schumpeter, the entrepreneur did
not take responsibility for bringing into existence the new organiza-
tional system but merely served to precipitate an alteration in the
existing organizational pattern by the industrialists and merchants
who sought to benefit from the profit potential of an innovation.
14Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1934).
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Schumpeter's system had two basic flaws that have been corrected
by subsequent thinkers on the subject. The first was how to determine
an innovation. The second was in distinguishing between the pure type
of entrepreneur who moved on to other innovative activities and those
who continued to act like entrepreneurs yet remained to build a new
company around the innovation. In Schumpeter's ideal model there
existed no progression of activity. There were simply entrepreneurs
who precipitated the new combinations and managers who translated them
into new firms or new methods of production.
By describing entrepreneurship in the more general terms of
organization building, the discontinuity of Schumpeter's definition
has been overcome. A fundamental distinction of an entrepreneur is
that he or she must actively engage in building an organization to
suit the implementation of a new idea. Existing structures lock
resources away from the entrepreneur who wishes to direct them toward
a new venture.15 The present pattern of activity is a reflection of
past initiatives. It is the entrepreneur who must mold the current
pattern to provide him or her with the necessary autonomy and resources
to personally initiate new ventures.
Organizations are created in two basic ways. They are created by
selectively aggregating resources within existing structures. This
can be as formal as the creation of a new department within an
15 0rvis Collins and David Moore, The Organization Makers: A
Behavioral Study of Independent Entrepreneurs (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1970.
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established organization or as informal as drawing together a momentary
coalition to achieve a specific end. A second form of organization
building is to bring into existence an independent enterprise such as a
new company. The key entrepreneurial characteristi.c is that the
organization serves as a vehicle to place the individual or group in
an autonomous position and provides the resources for creative ini-
16
tiative.
Based on the experiences in the case studies, it appears the
development entrepreneur must view the organization building task on
three levels.
Creation of a Personal Organization
In each of the cases, the development/entrepreneur began by build-
ing his internal organization. A few, carefully selected individuals
are assembled to extend the skills and knowledge of the individual who
provided the initial vision. The entrepreneurial role in crafting
this internal organization appears to be the ability to aggregate key
personnel, financial and political resources into a strategic unit that
can serve as a bridge between the developer and the requirements of
the external development process. The case studies express three dif-
ferent forms of personal organization building. Howard and Adam
followed a pattern of organization building that is typical of inde-
16Albert Shapero and Lisa Sokol, The Social Dimensions of Entre-
preneurship (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982) p. 76.
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pendent businessmen. They carefully crafted new firms out of previous
business associates and useful new partners in such a way that they
preserved their decision-making authority as head of the firm. Howard
chose as his partner a past chairman of the state democratic party to
improve his political influence and credibility. He also chose young
ambitious staff members who would provide needed energy and expertise
yet remain loyal to his objectives. The key to Adam's enterprise is
access to capital so he chose partners who had money to invest but
lacked his entrepreneurial energy and talent.
For Peter and Jesse, the important aspect of building an internal
organization was to bring together the political strength of concerned
individuals to form the basis for an independent development company.
Each sought out a social context that had the latent potential to
coalesce under their leadership. The acquisition of additional tech-
nical and financial resources to engage in development could only be
achieved by aggregating into an internal organization key individuals
willing to provide credibility in the neighborhood and political clout
with city and state officials.
Edward and Stan created personal organization by restructuring
resources and personal affiliations within existing organizations.
Both discovered their entrepreneurial potential while in subordinate
staff positions. But unlike the others, they did not venture to start
a new independent firm. Rather, each slowly expanded his scope of
authority to gain greater control over the resources provided by the
existing organization. At the end of this process, both Edward and
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Stan had achieved as much autonomy to initiate and execute projects
as their counterparts who had become presidents or executive directors
of their own companies.
The creation of a hand tailored, flexible internal organization
designed to expand the resources of the development entrepreneur is a
key aspect of entrepreneurship in general and real estate entre-
preneurship in particular. Few industries require such a diverse
range of activities as real estate development. The key task for
the development entrepreneur is to anticipate the need for autonomy,
understand his or her personal limitations, calculate the range of
resources needed for a particular type of development, and begin to
build a personal organization.
Coalition Building
Contrary to both the technical and contextual models, the case
studies suggest that the development entrepreneur has significant
influence over the character and alignments of the external context
surrounding a project. The process of exploring the factors contained
within, what is here defined as, the development field has many of the
characteristics of entrepreneurial organization building. Each venture
into the development field appears to represent an effort to identify
informal allies and ferret out unforeseen opposition.
Consistent with the notion of catalyzing new combinations in the
existing organizational pattern, the development projects reviewed in
the cases each appears to require a broad coalition of actors that
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were brought together as a result of a specific project. Much of
this new pattern is predictable based on previous experience but, as
illustrated, many of the alignments in the development field are the
direct result of the informal organizing efforts of the development
entrepreneur. Stan's and Jesse's experiences provide the best
illustration of informal resources consolidation in the development
field.
Stan's proposal for a regional shopping center, contrary to
initial expectations, encountered massive resistance from a variety
of external sources. The local planning board, politicians, the
neighboring community, competitors, and state agencies were all drawn
into the process in unforseen ways. Rather than reject the project,
Stan began to analyze the potential for new coalitions that might be
formed in the development field through the strategic application of
his internal resources. His bold move to offer to match the funds for
the traffic improvements in the neighboring town is an excellent
example of how a developer may overcome resistance by appealing to
self interest. This action created the impetus for the state officials
to intercede in his behalf to gain the necessary approval for the
intersection improvements. Each venture into the development field
formed an exploratory effort to expand the informal organization around
the project. The new pattern that resulted from his efforts was neither
simply a source of information nor the incoherent conflict of vested
and uncompromising interests. It was a consciously crafted informal
organization that momentarily consolidated the necessary political and
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financial resources to facilitate the project outcome.
Jesse's experience with organization building in the development
field differs from Stan's only in quality not by nature of the activity.
The success of Jesse's project depended on the support of the city.
To gain this support, he used the political resources of his internal
organization to make successive excursions into the development field
and identify additional political and financial resources to bring to
bear on the city's decision to support the project. The creation of
his planning group was his most successful effort at informal organiza-
tion building. Its existence strategically restructured the pattern
of debate over his project. In the absence of the planning group many
of its members would have remained dispersed and possibly hostile to
the project. Collected together and given a specific task, they became
a vital resource for Jesse's project.
The case studies suggest that the process of building an informal
coalition to consolidate resources and consensus among the autonomous
elements affected by a project is a key determinate of success. To
view this explicitly as an organization building task, makes this
process appear less as a random and undirected occurence. It is within
the developer's influence to consciously structure new relationships
and precipitate events to form a supportive matrix of forces around the
project objectives.
Organizing a Development Team
The execution of a project requires a range of technical expertise
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and professional services. The case studies suggest, however, that
the development entrepreneur mai-ntains a very small, flexible internal
organization and must contract or temporarily hire these services.
Yet contrary to the technique suggested in the technical model, the
organization of a development team plays a strategic role as much in
reference to the need to foster positive coalitions in the surrounding
environment as it is in reference to the specific requirements of the
project.
Each of the development entrepreneurs interviewed initiated his
project relying on the limited resources provided by the internal
organization and an intuitive judgement on the feasibility for success.
The development team was then incrementally expanded over time to
address a particular concern or to overcome an obstruction. Howard
hired a senator to improve the local credibility of his development
proposal. Jesse hired planning consultants for the neighborhood task
force as a means of focusing city attention on the need for his project.
And Edward expanded his staff to document the job creation potential of
his project to convince the EDA of its merits.
This is not to suggest that the entire development team must be
structured as a means of manipulating external events and attitudes.
But the case studies do suggest that the organizing of a development
team can serve a broader strategic function than just formulating a
project plan.
Risk Control
Risk-taking is generally accepted as a distinguishing character-
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istic of entrepreneurship. However, entrepreneurs are not necessarily
gamblers. "The real point is that the gambler exercises no control
over the outcome, unless he uses loaded dice, whereas the entre-
preneur can influence by his actions whether his decisions will turn
out in the long run to be successful or unsuccessful." 1 7 The essential
operational task facing the entrepreneur is to structure a situation
to control his or her exposure to risk commensurate with the level of
uncertainty.
17 David C, McClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton, N.J.:
A Van Nostrand Company Inc., 1961), p. 211.
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The relationship between the actual level of risk and the per-
ceived level of uncertainty as suggested in the case studies is
expressed in Figure V. It should be noted that the term risk as
presented in Figure V reflects both the potential for success or
failure of the project and the amount of that risk actually born by
the entrepreneur. These two values may diverge in some situations
where the entrepreneur has been successful in shifting major portions
of the risk to third parties while continueing to promote a project
with dubious potential for success. However, this simplification
appears justified for this discussion because the individuals inter-
viewed identified so closely with the outcome of their projects. As
they worked to diminish their personal exposure to risk, they also
placed equal emphasis on increasing the chances of a successful project.
The period of greatest risk appears to be during the initial
phases of the development process. Yet it is also during this period
that the development entrepreneur has the least knowledge of the
uncertainty that lies ahead. Each of those interviewed reflected that
he had little initial understanding of the actual uncertainty that
surrounded his project. The risk of failure was high for both the
entrepreneur and the project as a whole because it was only through
instigation of the project that the actual dimensions of the uncertain-
ty were revealed.
However, as the process continued, it appears that in each of the
cases the burden of risk was successfully spread among a variety of
actors associated with the project. Peter's coalition with the Land
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Bank also placed that organization's credibility at risk if the tax
reform needed for his project was not obtained. Likewise, Stan's joint-
venture with the real-estate investment trust both shifted some of the
risk and significantly improved the changes for success. Also,.Edward's
successful application to the EDA for first phase funding was instru-
mental in overcoming other sources of uncertainty.
As the diagram suggests, the development entrepreneur attempts
to maintain an even or decreasing level of risk as the sources of
opposition and indifference are ferreted out. By the time the true
level of uncertainty was accurately perceived, ea'ch person~ interviewed
had successfully distributed the burden of risk thereby broadening
the range of support that could be relied on to improve the chances
for success.
Seizing Opportunity
A third general task associated with entrepreneurship is the per-
ceiving and seizing of opportunity. This aspect of entrepreneurship
is the subject of widely varying interpretation and can be found at
the root of many actions described as entrepreneurship. The ability
to accurately identify a new market or product opportunity is used by
many observers of business development to distinguish between the
entrepreneur and subsequent imitators, Similarly, in real estate the
person who is first to identify a fortuitous confluence of events (say
a new highway project that opens an area to an industry that had
previously shown little interest) is identified as an entrepreneur
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while others are merely merchant builders.
Yet, underlaying much of what entrepreneurs do is the task of
finding fortuitous circumstances to either initiate a project or
garner needed resources during its implementation. "In addition to
the exploitation of perceived opportunities, purposive human action
involves a posture of alertness toward the discovery of as yet unper-
ceived opportunities and their exploitation, towardnew valuations
with respect to ends, new availability of means--may be termed the
entrepreneurial element in individual decision."18
The case studies illustrate the central importance of alertness
to opportunity in real estate entrepreneurship. In each case the
development entrepreneur seized some form of an initial opport'unity to
determine the feasibility of his project. For Howard it was a new
highway interchange; for Edward it was a political crisis; for Peter
it was the ability of his project to serve as a symbol for abatement
reform; for Jesse it was the latent political unrest in the neighbor-
hood, etc.
One may view latent opportunity as a momentary but necessary
departure point for the more on-going organization building aspect of
entrepreneurship, but the case studies also indicate the importance
of seized opportunity as a more permanent aspect. It is very likely
18 Israel M. Kirzner, Perception, Opportunity, and Profit: Studies
in the Theory of Entrepreneurship (Chicago:.The University of Chicago
Press, 1979), p. 109.,
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that Jesse would not have succeeded in obtaining the housing subsi-
dies had he not also seized the opportunity to motivate the senator
to call a public hearing, and Adam's deal may have foundered had he
not identified the opportunity to make a recalcitrant land owner a
financial partner in his project.
As a source of instruction for action, the sequence of fortuitous
events found throughout the case studies may be erroneously dismissed
as lucky breaks. (This is how such events were frequently perceived by the
participants themselves). But the role of perceived opportunity
appears to serve a much more instrumental function in real estate
entrepreneurship. Opportunities may be presented from a variety of
sources: in the internal organization (the personal contacts of
Howard's project manager for obtaining options); in the project sphere
(the job creation potential of Edward's fish pier project that was the
key ingredient for EDA funding); or in the surrounding context (the
interest of the Land Bank in Peter's abatement reform efforts).
Although it is difficult to predict the availability of a decisive
opportunity, it is clear from the case studies that the development
entrepreneur must remain continually alert to their occurrence. Those
interviewed appear to achieve this objective by maintaining a relative
distance from the daily operations that surround a project. By remain-
ing somewhat autonomous, they preserve an overall image of the necessary
pattern of events and interactions that will facilitate the project,
When an opportunity presents itself, the development entrepreneur can
thereby gauge its relative significance and take action accordingly.
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Positive Projection
A fourth fundamental task of entrepreneurship expressed in the
case studies is the consistent conveyance of a positive image of
what may be possible if . . . . "Initiation of an independent organiza-
tion occurs at that moment when one man or a small group of men
envisages the need for and the possibility of bringing men, machines,
and material together to undertake an activity. We shall call this the
moment of 'projection.' A projection takes place when a man has an
'idea' and when he has the imaginative insight into how to implement
this idea."18
The preservation of a positive, compelling image of the ultimate
outcome is the basic entrepreneurial cement that allows the individual
to sustain confidence in his or her venture while executing the previous
three tasks. The positive projection is not actually the drawing up of
a precise implementation plan or even an exact image of the final
product. Rather, it is a cogent insight into a plausible sequence of
events that allows the less entrepreneurial individuals assembled by
the entrepreneur to understand and believe in the value of their con-
tributionand the ultimate feasibility of the venture.
The case studies universally express the importance of the develop-
ment entrepreneur's positive projection. At each stage of the develop-
ment process it is vitally important to motivate and gain the confidence
of individuals who have initially only a peripheral interest in the
entrepreneur's project, Two representative examples from the cases
19 0rvis Collins and David G. Moore, The Organization Maker, p. 4.
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include Adam and Peter.
In Adam's first deal, he was confronted with a situation where
his source of construction capital would not believe in either Adam's
ability to develop the project or to attract tenants. To overcome
this obstacle, Adam in turn approached a potential tenant and nego-
tiated a lease prior to construction based on Adam's conviction that
the project would ultimately prove feasible. It was further necessary
to also pre-sell a.major portion of the building to an investor. With
these two demonstrations of confidence in the project, Adam was able
to convince a bank to provide the construction funds. For Peter the
task was not dissimilar. To overcome the image of property owners
cheating the city out of tax dollars, he painted a picture of average
people taking control of their lives and rehabilitating abandoned
buildings.
Positive projection is similar to salesmanship but differs in
that the entrepreneur typically begins with only an idea. The sales-
man begins with a product and proceeds to instill in the mind of the
buyer an image of how the product may be useful. The entrepreneur
takes an idea and uses that idea to convince those who are necessary
for its realization to participate in some instrumental manner.
ATTRIBUTES OF A DEVELOPMENT ENTREPRENEUR
The concept of the entrepreneurial character has changed little
from when Schumpeter provided the first systematic investigation of
the entrepreneurial role in economic history. "Schumpeter's economic
leaders are individuals, motivated by an atavistic will to power . . .
Their special characteristics are an intuitional capacity to see
things in a way which afterwards proves correct, energy of will and
mind to overcome fixed habits of thought, and the capacity to with-
stand social opposition."20 Subsequent research on the entrepreneurial
character by McClelland, Macuso, Hornaday, and Kirzner has refined and
elaborated on this basic concept.
Based on the case studies, the basic character traits and skills
of the development entrepreneur can be summarized in the following four
categories.
Need for Individual Responsibility and Autonomy
A universal characteristic that appears to distinguish the entre-
preneur is the fundamental urge to free him or herself from subor-
dinate positions and gain full decision-making authority. As McClelland
suggests, entrepreneurs " . . . prefer to take personal responsibility
for their decisions and they want the outcome to depend on their own
skill and ability."21
2 0Peter Kilby, ed. Entrepreneurship and Economic Development
(New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 7.
2 1David C. McClelland, "The Achievement Motive in Economic Growth"
in Entrepreneurship and Economic Development. Edited by Peter Kilby
(New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 115.
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The urge for autonomy in decision-making and resource allocation
is amply evident in the case studies. However, there appears to be a
countervailing tendency to seek intermediate positions from which
necessary skill can be gained before one makes the crucial break into
a true entrepreneurial position. Although each development entrepreneur
reviewed demonstrated an early tendency toward independence, their
evolutionary path appears to divide into three categories. Howard and
Adam first sought to establish their status by pursuing careers in
engineering and spent long periods of time in subordinate positions
before fully realizing their desire and capacity to sustain the risks
and rigors as an independent entrepreneur. Stan and Edward on the
other hand, sought the autonomy for entrepreneurial action by creating
an independent niche for themselves within existing organizations. In
this respect, they were able to act like entrepreneurs while at the
same time limiting the scope of potential failure to the individual
project. Jesse and Peter created their positions of entrepreneurial
independence by molding a social context to provide them with the
decision-making authority they desired.
Tolerance for Making Decisions in Ambiguous and Uncertain Situations.
Entrepreneurs, by nature, are not methodical, rational decision-
makers. This is not to suggest that they make foolish decisions, but
as the case studies illustrate, entrepreneurial decisions rarely
benefit from adequate information and predictable cause/effect
relationships.
The individuals in the case studies demonstrate an ability to
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make decisions under a high degree of uncertainty. Over time, these
decisions appear as a pattern of strategic action: each decision
becomes a means to acquire additional information from the environment
with which to make the next decision. In this way, the significance
of uncertainty is diminished by incrementally exploring the dimensions
of the development task.
Each of the development entrepreneurs interviewed was comfortable
with allowing his hunches to guide action when little or no information
was available to determine accuracy. For instance, Edward was provided
with two preliminary studies with which to form a judgement on a
future course of action for the rehabilitation of the fish pier; Peter
had only a glimmer of hope for a tax abatement when he ran across the
street and bought the house for $500; and Howard had only a general
understanding of what could be developed when he placed an option
on the parcel of land.
This ability to make decisions with limited information on the
actual potential for success is a key attribute of the entrepreneur.
Without this capacity, an individual in an entrepreneurial position
would lack the flexibility to take decisive action at crucial points
in the implementation process. These actions may prove unfounded but
the entrepreneur seems to understand that the test of reality comes
only as a result of a decision to proceed.
Desire to Create
Throughout the literature, the entrepreneur appears to seek
decision-making authority as a means to directly participate in what
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h e feels is a creative process. The case studies suggest that the
development entrepreneur (like an artists) sees the fruits of his
labor not merely as a source of profit or a job well done, but rather
as a fundamental creative act. Howard expressed this attitude most
graphically by stating that development was like watching a child
grow. A similar attitude was expressed toward the work of each of
those interviewed.
The project examples used to illustrate the individual's role as
builder/creator may leave some doubt (depending on one's values) as
to their "artistic" value, but it appears clear that the desire to
see the final outcome as a product of the entrepreneur's personal
will and imagination is one of the fundamental sustaining influences
on his activities.
Collier expresses this aspect of the entrepreneurial character
as the "Creative idea." "Pleasure, power, and fame appear to be but
by-products of the efforts we make to be useful members of society
and to leave it with something more than it had when we arrived.
Perhaps we leave only the grain of sand that Robert Frost said he
wished to leave in the beach of history; but at least, if we do that,
we can feel that we have fulfilled our role." 2 2
Attitude Toward Risk
The attitude toward the consequences of personal failure varies
2 2Abram T. Collier,"Business Leadership and a Creative Society"
in Executive Success. Edited by Eliza Collins (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, Inc., 1983), p. 171.
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greatly in the case studies. Like most entrepreneurs, those inter-
viewed sought to balance their concern for personal risk with the
overriding need to place themselves in positions of decision-making
authority and influence McClelland's work on the psychology of the
enterpreneur found that individuals with a high need for personal
achievement do not, in fact, see themselves as taking high risks. 2 3
Not that they are unaware of the uncertainty of achieving their task,
entrepreneurs simply rely more heavily on their ability to overcome
obstacles as they arise. (This relationship between risk and
perceived uncertainty is expressed in Figure V.) In McClelland's
words, entrepreneurs tend to initially disregard uncertainty "but as
reality cues become available, they tend to base their judgements on
these cues. They are not impractical 'dreamers' overestimating their
chances for success at everything; instead they rely on facts so far
as they are available, and then fall back on generalized self-
confidence." 24
The attitudes toward risk expressed in the case studies may be
divided into three categories that link the entrepreneur's perception
of failure with its consequences on them as individuals.2 5
2 3David C. McClelland. The Achieving Society (Princeton, N.J.:
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961), p. 222.
24Ibid., p. 223.
25
A study by Patrick Liles of entrepreneurs who started new
business ventures include the category of family risk in this list.
However, those interviewed for this thesis made little mention of
their families or non-professional relationships outside of their work
environment. Patrick R. Liles, New Business Ventures and the Entre-
preneur (Homewood, Ill: Richard C. Irwin, Inc., 1974), pp. 13-15.
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Financial risk did not appear to be of great concern in the case
studies. Although Adam placed great emphasis on mitigating the
potential for financial loss he did not place it high in his assess-
ment of personal risk. Howard's attitude appears more typical on
this point. Money is simply the cost of participation. Financial
loss or gain on any one project is more a method of keeping score.
Conversely the attitude toward the implications of failure in
one.s career appears to be one of great concern in the case studies.
As Adam expressed it "reputation is what we are selling." The develop-
ment entrepreneurs interviewed in the case studies were primarily
concerned with the perceptions of their future effectiveness on the
part of those around them.
A third concern, with respect to risk, expressed in the case
studies is the implication of failure on ones own self image. It is
clear from their experiences and actions, that those interviewed had
a very strong personal identification with their work. With this
attitude, the psychic costs of failure would be very high. One may
only speculate from the information in the case studies, but it appears
that personal ego is what the entrepreneur places at greatest risk
with his ventures.
CONCLUSION
This thesis was motivated by a desire to formulate a model for
executive decision-making in socially oriented development organiza-
tions (e.g., public authorities,development agencies of local govern-
ments, and neighborhood non-profi't groups). Through my experiences
with two non-profit development corporations, a two-year position as
project supervisor in the Peace Corps, and my academic studies of
the development process, I have become convinced that executives in
the field of public development have very few guidelines with which
to accurately define their role.
I began this thesis with a twofold purpose: 1) to clarify my
understanding of entrepreneurial behavior; and 2) to apply this
understanding to individual decision-making in the context of
socially oriented development organizations. Consistent with my
experience, the initial hypothesis was that executives in public
service type organizations use a different framework for decision
making than their counterparts in private enterprise. Much to my
disappointment, the case studies provided very little evidence to
support this hypothesis. As a result, the hypothesis was rejected
and in its place was substituted the discussion of alternative
decision models exclusively within the context of real estate
development. As a devise for my own personal learning process, this
proved moderately adequate. But by only succeeding with the first half
of the original concept for the thesis, the text is now more des-
criptive than instructive for the reader.
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I attribute this outcome to a unforseen consequence of the
research method used for the study. The original intent was to focus
on the individual decision-maker (distinct from the organization) as
a means of gaining personalized descriptions of alternative modes of
action between individuals in social and profit oriented contexts.
However, by choosing development as the unifying theme and focusing
solely on a group of successful, highly motivated individuals in the
two types of organizations, the similarities proved more striking
than the differences. The error in this method was in assuming that
individuals who had already demonstrated a high degree of entrepre-
neurial effectiveness in each of the two settings would describe
their specific actions and decisions during the implementation of a
project in different terms.
The major distinction between the members of the two groups
(placing Jesse, Edward and Peter in the socially oriented group and
Howard, Stan and Adam in the profit oriented group) was in their
perception of the positive benefit of the final outcome. The members
of each group expressed similar attitudes toward autonomy, the need
to see their efforts translate into a permanent physical product, and
possessed a common set of organizational and promotional skills. But
they fundamentally differed on what they felt were the long-range
implications of their work.
Those in the socially oriented organizations assessed the primary
outcome of their work in terms of social change. Physical development
was only a means of focusing their own entrepreneurial energies and
served as a vehicle to achieve some broader social objectives.
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Jesse's primary ambition was to create a permanent, constructive
organization that would directly engage the disinfranchised members
of the community in decisions concerning the physical development of
their neighborhood. For Peter the objective was to demonstrate the
feasibility of self-help in the rehabilitation of abandoned buildings
and to remove tax barriers which would allow low-income people to
emulate his model. Edward consciously professed fewer explicit social
objectives of his work, yet it appears that he gained a major source
of his satisfaction from insuring the survival of the fishing
industry. He took particular pride in the creative rent structure
which reduced operating costs for the fish processors and in fostering
innovative fish processing techniques necessary to modernize the
industry.
Howard, Stan, and Adam, on the other hand, identified exclusively
with the physical project at hand. The nature of their entrepreneurial
character is equally complex, but the primary objective was to get the
job done and move on to the next project. For this group, physical
development is an end in itself, and the principal entrepreneurial
concern is how well one personally plays the game. The effect of
their actions on the communities and social institutions that they
either outwitted or preempted during the implementation process was
only of concern to the extent that they effected the achievement of
the preeminent project outcome.
The only real conclusion one may draw from the case studies, as
currently constituted, is that personal effectiveness in development
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depends on similar skills in the two types of organizations regardless
of the value judgements one places on the long-range benefits of the
development process. Nevertheless, this conclusion alone is instruc-
tive for formulating a model for executive decision-making in socially
oriented development organizations. As the case studies suggest,
individuals with a high level of initiative and entrepreneurial skill
tend to "drift" into their independent positions--propelled by a
negative feeling toward previous more subordinate experiences.
For individuals in a profit oriented context this transition
is fairly well defined. The methods for starting a new company (or
a new venture within an existing organization) and directly initiating
development projects are clearly articulated in the business and
real estate literature. However, for entrepreneurial individuals in
public service few sources of instruction are available. How does
one consciously consider initiating and implementing a new organiza-
tion or project without violating one's sense of public accounta-
bility? Images of Robert Moses come quickly to the mind when
considering these questions in the public sector.
If my original hypothesis is correct (the limited and admittedly
flawed set of case studies included in this report not withstanding)
how exactly does one explicitly prepare for, and evaluate an entre-
preneurial position in public service development organizations?
Most of the individuals faced with this question have a background
in some aspect of physical planning or public policy: careers that
appear appropriate entrees to development in the public domain.
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Yet, the training one receives in these fields makes little mention
of entrepreneurial skills. Conversely, the individual with a back-
ground in private real estate development may have a well-developed
formula for entrepreneurial initiative but will lack the social
sensitivity with which to adapt to the constraints of a public
setting.
In closing, I would like to offer several comments on how entre-
preneurship might be taught within a curriculum designed to prepare
people for public service. In addition to this study, and the
personal experiences alluded to earlier, my interest in this subject
was reinforced by a course that I taught (along with Joe Soley) on
the topic of entrepreneurship in the Department of Urban Studies and
Planning at MIT. The experiences with this course will form the
basis of many of the following comments on the training of individuals
who may pursue executive positions in public and quasi-public
development organizations.
Development, as it is investigated within the context of a public
service curriculum, is typically discussed either in the terms of
social and interorganizational dynamics,or in terms of the set of
specific skillsone will need to effectively perform technical tasks
such as finance or site planning. These two points of view correspond
roughly to the contextual and technical models described earlier.
It is my impression that students respond positively to these
methods for describing the development process because they reinforce
expectations of what public service will require in the future.
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Students typically define their career goals in terms of participating
in a process of development that will lead to the implementation of a
project. The emphasis for these students is on assisting a particular
social constituency to more effectively engage in real estate develop-
ment. The relevant areas of study,thus.,include negotiation, techniques
for consensus building, and comprehensive methods of data collection
and analysis. Alternatively, students consider their future role as
one of providing specialized technical skills to a pre-existing public
development organization. Areas of study in this case become real
estate finance, design, law, etc.
Neither of these methods for describing the development process
are necessarily contradictory to the executive function (as the case
studies illustrate); however, they serve to emphasize the more
administrative aspects of development rather than provide useful guides
for executive decision-making in the face of fragmentation, conflict,
limited resources, and even more limited information on what the future
will hold. The case studies suggest (and my personal experiences
corroborate) that the essential ingredients for success in development
are the ability to make intuitive judgements, decisive action, and
the formulation of compelling strategies that can foster the support
of a broad range of hitherto uninterested or hostile parties.
I do not dispute that those in preparation for public service
should have a strong sense of personal accountability to a broader
social constituency,nor that they should ground themselves in a set
of systematic technical skills. The suggestion of this study is
114
merely that students should also be provided with some framework with
which to understand the function and importance of executive decision-
making in motivating and guiding the development process.
This thesis offers the concept of entrepreneurship as one
possible method to focus attention on the role of the individual or
small group in taking the risks in initiating and implementing new
development ventures. Entrepreneurship is most commonly associated
with the creation of new profit oriented business enterprises and much
of its historical and theoretical underpinning is based on this
premise. However (as I have attempted to illustrate in this study)
entrepreneurship, in the broadest definition of the term, consists of
a loosely affiliated set of skills necessary to initiate and sustain
change in any economic or social setting.
It is clear that many students will not initially consider them-
selves in pursuit of executive authority. The experiences of the
individuals in the case studies suggest that most people who possess
latent entrepreneurial skills and personality traits tend to "drift"
into an entrepreneurial role following some period of apprenticeship.
The introduction of entrepreneurial skills into an educational curricu-
lum, thus, should not challenge this important aspect of training and
personal evolution of executive capacity. Rather the emphasis should
be on providing a basic framework with which the individual can
identify the entrepreneurial content of his or her future professional
experiences and assess his or her personal capacity to fill such a role.
Among the fifteen students who attended the class that Mr. Soley and I
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offered on this subject, few entered with a clear understanding of
the techniques necessary to actually initiate and organize a real
estate development effort. However, by providing an opportunity for
the students to conceptually place themselves in an executive posi-
tion, each was motivated to explore a personal framework for
entrepreneurial decision-making and action.
The issue of whether entrepreneurial skills can be taught in a
classroom context has been the subject of continued debate in the
academic literature. The general conclusion of research on the issue
is that it is possible to reinforce latent entrepreneurial talent
through instruction. Consistent with this point of view, my own
opinion is that students need to know what they want to accomplish.
Course materials, and examples of the entrepreneurial role in develop-
ment only serve to suggest how one might formulate alternative means
to achieve the desired objective.
Jesse's experience in the case study provides an illustration
of how a course on entrepreneurship can be of assistance in linking
executive skills with a strong personal ambition. Jesse entered MIT
with, a somewhat vague desire to organize a non-profit development
corporation in a low-income community. Yet,his studies in public
policy, finance, and the general process of implementation were only
partially useful in illustrating the essential skills he would have
to draw on to achieve this objective in practice and implement a
project.
The task of explicitly preparing people to pursue an executive
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position in socially oriented development organizations is difficult
to perform in the context of an educational program designed around
the public service professions. Unlike business and engineering
curricula (where the study of entrepreneurship is most highly
developed), such a program must preserve a balance between the public
as client and ultimate bearer of the consequences of failure, and the
emphasis placed on the significance of the entrepreneurial individual
or group. Carried to its extreme, entrepreneurship in a public
setting can become naked subtrifuge of the political process and
counterproductive competitiveness. Nevertheless, it is evident from
the case studies that the initiation and implementation of development
projects in the public interest have many of the same characteristics
of fostering new ventures for solely profit-making purposes.
To integrate all of the social, political, and technical ingre-
dients into an explicit format for executive action, I propose a
twofold approach to curriculum design. The first is to specifically
introduce models of the development process into courses that investi-
gate one or another of its many aspects. The emphasis of each of
these models should be on the implications on the conscious organiza-
tion of the development process suggested by the particular subject
under study. If the course material focuses on the political or
interorganization negotiation process that surrounds the implementa-
tion of a project, the model should illustrate the suggested con-
straints and opportunities for creative initiative on the part of the
development executive. If the subject is real estate finance or
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market analysis, the model should highlight how these functions can
be instrumentally integrated into the development process.
The guiding theme in each of these illustrations should be on
the strategic importance of particular aspects of the development
process as viewed from the perspective of those who carry the
immediate responsibility for the day to day tasks of organizing and
orchestrating implementation.
To avoid interference with the particular subject matter at hand,
the modelling aspect of the curriculum may be introduced by means of
periodic discussions with guest lecturers who have confronted, in
practice, the issues suggested by the course material. The technical
and contextual models formulated above are only two of many possible
methods to conceptually integrate the various aspects of the develop-
ment process as it moves from idea through to project completion.
The second ingredient of my proposed educational format is the
institution of an Executive Development Seminar based on the concepts
of entrepreneurship. This seminar would run parallel to the regular
curriculum and would meet once a week. The format of the Executive
Development Seminar would be a combination of case study materials
drawn from the other classes and a series of guest lectures by
successful development entrepreneurs invited from both social and
profit oriented organizations. The major difference between the
seminar and the supporting course work is that in this context the
student would be conceptually placed in the central decision-making
role rather than analyzing the development process as an outside
observer.
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Based on the cases and lectures, the student would be requested
to formulate specific strategies for action at key points in the
development process. At the end of the seminar, each student would
prepare a detailed discussion of the entrepreneurial aspects of an
actual development venture of his or her choosing.
In summary, this suggested format would differ from that typically
used in conventional real estate courses and business schools in three
basic ways:
1. It would provide an opportunity for students interested in
development from either the public or profit point of view
to integrate their specific course work into a common frame-
work of executive decision-making and action. Real estate
courses that currently integrate case material and
decision-making typically explore the entrepreneurial role
only from the private developer's point of view.
2. It would create less confusion between course materials
designed to highlight particular aspects of the development
process, and the role of the development executive. Students
would be provided an opportunity to exclusively explore and
discuss the entrepreneurial tasks associated with a wide
range of public and private development ventures.
3. Finally, this format would specifically and consciously
instill an understanding of entrepreneurial action in
students (especially those in pursuit of public service
careers) who may have never considered these important
issues during the course of their studies.
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1 have found the study of entrepreneurship to be very useful in
assessing my own real estate development activities in socially oriented
organizations. In many respects, the preparation of this thesis has
represented an exercise in personal education. However, I hope that
its contents and concluding thoughts will be useful to others who may
find themselves in similar entrepreneurial roles.
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